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~~1:1.. ptember 2 r, 1982 
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
Conference 
List 17, Sheet 2 
No. 82-15 
OLIVER 
Cert to CA 6 ~r-) 
(Engel, Merri Kenne-
dy, Martin, in majority~ 51-tJ -11 
Edwards, Lively, Keith, Jones, -r 
in dissent) " v. 
UNITED STATES Federal/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr contends that the 
trine does not permit a warrantless search 
field not visible from any ace of public access, particularly 
when the police had been the property. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: On July 18, 1980, the 
Kentucky State Police received an anonymous telephone call in-
forming them that marijuana was growing on petr's farm. Without 
obtaining a warrant, two plainclothes policemen went to the farm 
that afternoon in an unmarked car to investigate. Leaving the 
public highway, they turned down a private, gravel road which 
they knew to be petr's. Along this road they saw at least four 
v' v' "No Trespassing" signs, which they ignored. After several hun-
dred yards they passed petr's house and the road narrowed. With-
out stopping at the house to seek permission, they proceeded 
along the road for another 3/4 of a mile until a locked, metal 
gate, marked with a "No Trespassing" sign, blocked the road. 
v ~ 
They saw the sign, which they ignored, but were unable to see any 
contraband. Leaving their car, they continued on foot through a 
gap in the fence near the gate. Several hundred yards beyond the 
gate was a barn and a parked camper. They looked around, but 
they were still unable to see any contraband. They proceeded for 
another 1/4 of a mile along a curved, dirt path running through a 
field and a wooded area when an unidentified man standing near 
the camper shouted at them,~elling them to leave the property. 
They returned to the camper, but found no one. Resuming their 
search, they continued along the path until they reached a se-
cluded field located 1.4. miles from petr's house in which mari-
juana was growing. This field could not be seen from the nearest 
point of public access. 
At petr's trial on charges of manufacturing marijuana, 
·~ the DC (WD Ky~ Johnstone) followed Katz v. United States, 389 
u.s. 347 (1967), and suppressed the evidence discovered during 
the warrantless search. The DC concluded that petr had asserted 
his privacy interest in the field where the marijuana was discov-
ered, this expectation of privacy was reasonable, and no excep-
tions to the warrant requirement applied. 
On the government's interlocutory appeal, a CA6 panel 
(Lively, Keith, Rice [DJ)) affirmed. The panel considered the 
"open field" doctrine announced in Hester v. United States, 265 
u.s. 57 (1924), but decided that the doctrine had been modified 
by Katz. In Katz, this Court observed that "the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places." 389 u.s., at 351. The test is not 
whether an area is "constitutionally protected," but whether the 
individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Applying 
this test, the panel agreed with the DC that petr had a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy, and that this expectation was rea-
sonable. 
CA6 en bane reversed the panel in a 5-4 decision, hold-
ing that the Fourth Amendment does not protect an open field, 
regardless of the owner's reasonable expectation of privacy. The 
majority held that Katz had not modified Hester for three rea-
sons: (1) Katz involved circumstances that were not contemplated 
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted (i.e., a public telephone 
booth), while Hester involved a distinction "as old as the common 
law" (i.e., between field and house); (2) the Katz Court noted 
that the parties had agreed that an open field was beyond Fourth 
Amendment protection, and Justice Harlan, concurring, continued 
to treat the place as a relevant factor; and (3) since Katz, the 
,. 
Court has cited Hester "without indicating that its principle has 
been diluted." Finally, the majority rejected a suggestion that 
the marijuana field was not an "open field" within the scope of 
the rule, arguing that the distinction was between "open field" 
and "curtilage." Since the field was not part of the curtilage, 
it was an "open field." 
The principal dissent (Edwards, Lively, Keith, Jones) 
objected to the adoption of a per se rule for all "open field" 
cases. The dissent first noted that the majority had misread 
Hester, which merely permitted agents to trespass in an area from 
which the public had not been excluded, and to view that which 
was exposed to public view. It was in Olmstead v. United States, 
277 u.s. 438 (1928), that the open field doctrine was really 
born. There the Court held that a warrantless wiretap did not 
violate' the Fourth Amendment because there was no "actual physi-
cal invasion of [the] house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of 
making a seizure." 277 u.s., at 466. In Katz, however, the me-
chanical application of the "constitutionally protected places" 
analysis, on which both parties had relied, was rejected. The 
narrow holding of Hester remained valid: what a person knowingly 
exposes to the public is not a subject of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection. But when the public is excluded from an area, and the 
object seized in the area is not exposed to public view, then the 
Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test applies. In Air 
Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa, 416 u.s. 861 (1974), 
and Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 u.s. 307 (1978), for example, 
the Court's analysis turned on the fact that the inspectors were 
able to make their observations in places from which the public 
had not been excluded. Here the public was excluded from petr's 
farm, so the Katz test should be applied. 
Lively also filed a separate dissent, concluding that 
the marijuana field was not an "open field" subject to the open 
field exception. He argued that an open field was one from which 
the public had not been excluded. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the majority misap-
plied the open field doctrine, essentially for the reasons given 
by the dissent. 
The SG, while offering to file a response on the merits 
if the Court requests one, has filed a memorandum in opposition 
contending that the case is not ripe for review. He argues that 
this issue can be reviewed later if petr is convicted, but that 
it will become moot if petr is acquitted. He also argues that 
there is no need to hold this case for Florida v. Brady, No. 81-
1636, since petr will reap the benefit of a favorable decision 
there if he is convicted and appeals. 
4. DISCUSSION: This case clearly presents the question 
whether there should be a "bright line" open field doctrine. The 
government did not contend that there were exigent circumstances 
justifying the searchi it did not even claim that there was prob-
able cause for the search. The CA held that ~ search of an 
open field (i.e., any area outside the curtilage) is permitted 
under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the steps that an owner 
has taken to secure his privacy or the steps that the government 
must take to defeat this privacy. 
r 
The issue is essentially the same as that now before the 
Court in Florida v. Brady, No. 81-1636, but in some ways this 
case frames the issue more clearly. In Brady the police were 
seeking to intercept an airplane delivery, where the circum-
stances could be .a good deal more exigent, and that is not an 
issue here. Although the Brady entry onto the property was more 
forcible (there was no property damage here--except to the mari-
juana) , the police were requested to leave the property in the 
present case. 
I am unconvinced by the SG's ripeness argument. Al-
though the ~peal is interlocutory, this issue is ripe for re-
view. The factual record is well established, the issue is 
clearly presented, and nothing can be expected to develop at tri-
al to assist in the resolution of the open field question. (It 
is much more likely that extraneous issues, with which the Court 
does not wish to deal, will develop.) I am actually a little 
surprised that the SG does not welcome the opportunity to argue 
in Brady. I would think that the Court could benefit from his 
participation. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend CFR on the merits, with 
an eye to consolidating with Florida v. Brady, No. 81-1636. 
There is a memorandum in opposition dealing only with 
the ripeness issue. 
08/12/82 Sturley Opins in petn 
f6~2CO J/lr.e % ~ ~ tr ~ 
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MAINE 
v. 
Cert to Maine Sup. Jud. Ct. 
(per Carter) 
THORNTON (4th Amend claimant) State/Criminal Timely 
rr-
1. SUMMARY: The State claims erred in its determination 
·~ " that the ~en fields doctrine did not justify a warrantless 
search of a heavily wooded area of resp's property. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: An informant told police that 
he had seen marijuana growing in back of a mobile home off Davis 
Corner Road. Two officers, without a search warrant, left the 
Davis Corner Road, walked across the property between the mobile 
home and an adjacent house until they reached an overgrown woods 
road, used only as a footpath. The officers continued up the 
footpath until they found marijuana growing in two clearings 
fenced with chicken wire. The clearings were at least several 
hundred feet from resp's house. The officers then left the 
property, and checked the town maps to "find out for sure" who 
owned the property. The officers then obtained a search warrant 
and returned to seize the marijuana. 
Resp, the owner of the property, was indicted for violations 
of state drug laws. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court suppressed the evidence. The TC determined that resp "had 
no intent to expose the enclosures to either public or police 
view. The intent to avoid casual public view, and the efforts 
taken to generally exclude the public from his wooded propety, 
indicates the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
thereon. The officers were not innocently upon any property open 
to the public (the footpath or tote raod was evidently not a 
public way}, or in an area in which ownership of the land was 
unknown. Neither were the officers lawfully upon any neighboring 
property when they discovered the marijuana; such a view was 
impossible from adjacent land." 
On appeal, the Maine SJC affirmed the suppression order. 
The Court first rejected the State's claims that certain findings 
of the TC were clearly erroneous. Specifically, the SJC upheld 
the findings that resp's property was posted with a number of 
signs prohibiting trespassing and hunting, and that the officers 
had to cross a stone wall in disrepair to get into the woods. 
The SJC did find, however, it was possible to enter resp's 
property without observing anything except the stone wall. 
The SJC then determined that resp's conduct evidenced "a 
clear expectation of privacy. He chose a spot for the marijuana 
patches that was observable only from his land: he posted No 
Trespassing and No Hunting signs on his land: he generally 
excluded the public from his land." 
Finally, the SJC attempted to reconcile the open fields 
doctrine of Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), and the 
reasonable expectation of privacy approach of Katz v. United 
States, 389 u.s. 347 (1967), by determining that "in Maine, for 
the open fields doctrine to apply," the court must consider (1) 
the openness with which the activity is pursued: and (2) the 
lawfulness of the officers' presence during their observations. 
Here, the State demonstrated neither requirement. The defendant 
"made every effort" to conceal his activity: nothing about his 
enterprise was open or knowingly exposed to the public. Second, 
the officers were never legitimately on resps's property. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The State notes that the open fields 
doctrine is in a state of confusion. This case presents a 
virtually identical issue to Florida v. Brady, cert granted, No. 
81-1636 (May 24, 1982)~ The case conflicts with the CA6 en bane 
holding in Oliver v. United States, 686 F.2d 356 (CA6 1982), cert 
granted, No. 82-15 (Jan. 24, 1983). 
The resp contends that, even if Oliver correctly determined 
that the search there was justified by the open fields doctrine, 
~ ... 
- 4 -
the present case is distinguishable. Here, the patches were only 
150 feet from resp's house, whereas in Oliver the marijuana was 
found a mile and a half from the defd't s house. Further, the 
area in Oliver was in fact "open" and a "field," whereas here the 
area was heavily wooded. Finally, in Oliver the expectation of 
privacy was based largely on No Trespassing signs and a locked 
gate. Here, testimony indicated that resp had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy beyond the signs and fences. [Resp does 
not spell out what other measures he finds significant.] 
4. DISCUSSION: This case is clearly at least a hold for 
Oliver. Although the case comes from a state court, there is no 
hint of an independent state ground. On the contrary, the heart 
of the opinion analyzes Hester and Katz, and the opinion 
concludes that unreasonable searches, such as this one, violates 
the fourth amendment. 
Perhaps, however, this case should be the one the Court uses 
for argument. The Court originally granted Florida v. Brady to 
analyze the open fields doctrine. A potential "standing" problem 
arose in that the owner of the fields--i.e., the person with the 
greatest expectation of privacy--was not before the Court. The 
Court then granted Oliver, and is holding Brady. A similar 
standing problem may exist in Oliver, however. The SG's 
supplemental memorandum in Oliver notes that the defendant there 
disclaimed any personal interest in the part of the farm around 
the gate, asserting that he leased the land behind the gate to 
third parties. Much of the dispute in Oliver concerns the 
- J -
officer's actions in walking around the locked gate through a 
small opening in the fence. 
In this case, it seems clear that petr owns and controls all 
the property at issue. There should be no "standing" concerns in 
this case. I recommend granting this case and setting it for 
argument instead of Oliver, No. 82-15. Alternately, perhaps both 
cases could be considered together. 
There is a response. 
March 23, 1983 Schwab opns in petn 
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I. FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW 
The facts of these two cases are set out aptly in the -
briefs and are unimportant to the legal question presented here. 
I will refer to the facts only as necessary to illustrate the 
relevant legal principles. The two decisions rendered below 
illustrate the confusion over application of the 4th Amendment to 
- ? 
"open fields" @ adopted a per se approach in Oliver, holding 
that the Fourth Amendment recognizes no privacy interests in an 
open field, the~ in Thornton adopted a case-by-case 
approach and held that the defendant in that case had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the woods behind his house 
that was protected by the 4th Amendment. 1 This Court granted 
cert. to resolve the conflict illustrated by these two decisions. 
The Courts of Appeals and the state courts are all over the place 
on the issue. 2 
1Respondent in Thornton argues that the judgment below rests on 
an adequate and independent state ground because the state court 
relied primarily on state cases in making its ruling. Resp. Br. 
at 9-10 vThe argument is unpersuasive. The state court based its 
decision squarely on this Court's decision in Katz v. United 
States, 389 u.s. 347 (1967), and the protection provided by the 
4th Amendment. 
2The Court has held three other cases pending decision in 
Oliver and Thornton: Florida v. Brady, No. 81-1636 (4th Amendment 
violated by government trespass on open field); United States v. 
Dunn, No. 82-508 (4th Amendment violated by government trespass 
in open curtilage of residence); Anderson v. Oklahoma, NO. 82-
2030 (no 4th Amendment violation where government trespassed on 




II. RELEVANT PRECEDENT 
The "open fields" doctrine originated in Justice /~ 
Holmes's two-and-a-half page opinion in Hester v. United States, 
265 U.S. 57 (1924). That opinion announced without explanation 
that "the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to 
the people in their 'person, houses, papers, and effects,' is not 
extended to the open field." 265 u.s. at 59 In that case, 
revenue officers trespassed onto defendant's land and saw him 
selling liquor to customers in front of his house. Because the 
incriminating evidence took place in an open field, it was not 
protected by the 4th Amendment and not subject to the 
T&aft~ 
The Court re-affirmed the "open fields" doctrine in ~ 
exclusionary rule. 
passing reference in Olmstead v. United States, 277 u.s. 438~~ 
(l~er than that passing approval, Olmstead is relatively~ 
unimportant to the issue presented here. The Court held there I~ 
that taped phone conversations were not obtained in violation o~ 
the 4th Amendment where the wire taps were achieved 
physical invasion of defendants' private property. 
without J 
viKatz v. United States, 389 u.s. 347 (1967), o~rruled 
Olmstead and held that private phone conversations are entitled 
to 4th Amendment protection even where there has been no 
trespass. In Katz, defendant entered a public phone booth that ---was partly glass, closed the door, paid his toll, and placed his 
call. The Government eavesdropped on the call by means of an 
electronic device placed on the outside of the booth. This Court 
•r, 
'-(~~ 
held that the evidence should be excluded under the 4th ~~ 
.It '-{~ 
Amendment. It held that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, 
not places," 389 u.s. at 351, and noted that "' [t)he premise that 
property interests control the right of the Government to search 
and seize has been discredited.'" 389 u.s. at 353 (quoting Warden 
v. Hayden, 387 u.s. 294, 304 (1967) (Brackets in Katz text). 
Justice Harlan concurred and announced a two-prong test //~~ 
to determine when people may claim 4th Amendment protection: 
"[F]irst .•. a person [must] have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, ••• the 
expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize 
as 'reasonable.'" 389 u.s. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
Defendants argue correctly that Katz overruled the 
strict "trespass doctrine" applied in Olmstead. They also 
correctly argue that the two-prong Katz test substitutes an 
analysis that focuses on privacy expectations for one that 
"'--= ~ '- .... 
focuses on property rights. 3 However, it does not follow that 
Katz precludes a per se rule declaring that open fields evoke no 
privacy interests under the 4th Amendment. To the contrary, such 
a rule is arguably more consisten.t with Katz than an analysis 
that focuses on property boundaries and no trespass signs. 
3without specific reference to Katz, this Court relied on the 
"open fields" doctrine in Air POliUtion Variance Board v. Western \ 
Alfalfa, 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974), to hold that a field inspector 
violates no legitimate privacy interests when he trespasses on 
commercial property from which the public has not been excluded. 
;• 
III. DISCUSSION 
Hester and Katz are consistent: both recognize that the 
touchstone for 4th Amendment protection is not a person's 
property interests, but his privacy interests. See also United 
States v. Knotts, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 1085 (1983): Smith v. Maryland, 
442 u.s. 735, 740-41 (1979). Police violate the 4th Amendment 
when they intrude unreasonably on legitimate expectations of 
privacy, whether these expectations be held on public or private 
property. If police make an unreasonable entry onto private 
property, they may violate state trespass laws. However, if 
there are no legitimate expectations of privacy connected with 
that private property, the police violate no constitutional 
rights and the exclusionary rule generally will not apply. 
The question in this case is wh~ther privacy -----------
expectations cognizable under the 4th Amendment ever exist in an ... 
open field. The Government argues for a per se rule answering 
this question in the negative. Defendants argue that legitimate 
..___ 
expectations of privacy may exist in a field. They argue that 
the two-prong test announced in Justice Harlan's Katz concurrence 
should be applied to each field to determine whether any such 
privacy interests exist. 
A. A Per Se Approach 
I find this a close case, but on balance I believe that 
the Government's per se rule is the wisest course. Justice 
.' .... 
Holmes had no trouble reaching that conclusion in Hester. 
Despite the trespass by revenue officers onto defendant's land, 
he concluded quite simply that the 4th Amendment does not protect 
any privacy interests in an open field. See Hester, 265 u.s. at 
59. The test that Justice ' arlan announced in Katz is not to the -
contrary. He agreed with the majority's statement that "'the /f~ 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.'" 389 u.s. at 361 ~T 
I 
However, he observed that "[g) enerally, •.• the answer to that 
question requires reference to a 'place.'" 389 u.s. at 361 He 
then announced his two-prong test, which I interpret as follows: 
whether the person has shown subjective expectations 
in that place; ~ ask whether it is reasonable to 
4th Amendment protection to those expectations in that 
The Government argues that this Court should adopt a ~ 
se rule that would answer this second prong and make the first 
irrelevant: the 4th Amendment does not protect privacy interests 
in a field. 
The common sense rationale for this rule is that people 
---generally do not do extremely private things in a field. They 
generally do not live, sleep, eat, or dress in a field. They 
generally do not store their personal belongings or their private 
papers in a field. People of course may do as they wish with 
their private property. They may use their fields as places in 
which to do all sorts of private things, and they may take lawful 
efforts to exclude these things from public view. However, if 
they wish their privacy protected by the 4th Amendment, they must 
move indoors. This per se rule is consistent with this Court's 
,fi .. , 
repeated interpretations of the second prong of the Katz test. 
In Smith v. Maryland, 442 u.s. at 740, the Court explained that 
"[c]onsistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the 
application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person 
invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a 
~ ~----------------~ 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has --been invaded by government action." See also Knotts, 103 s.ct. 
at 1085: Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 150-53 {1978) {POWELL, 
J., concurring). 
This per se rule is not as harsh as it seems at first 
blush. People may establish privacy interests in their fields 
and protect them from public view and intrusion. State trespass 
laws are the primary source of such protection. Presumably, one 
may seek protection from unlawful police entries onto one's 
private fields by resorting to state trespass laws. The per se 
rule urged by the Government means only that the exclusionary 
rule generally will not apply to suppress evidence seized from an 
open field during an alleged trespass. 
Moreover, a per se "open fields" rule would not open 
everything found in a field to government intrusion. Private 
conversations held in a field that cannot be overheard with the 
naked ear would be subject to 4th Amendment protection under the 
Katz test. Similarly, enclosed structures located in an open 
field may be subject to 4th Amendment protection under the Katz 
test. For example, if a police officer is trespassing in an open 
field, the per se rule announced here does not give him license 
to peer inside a barn located in that field. If there are 
legitimate privacy interests in that barn, he must obtain a 
warrant or identify exigent circumstances before peering inside. 
In sum, I think that the per se rule urged here is the wisest 
course. 
Application of that rule even to the extreme facts of 
~Brady confirms its common sense. In that case, police staked out 
defendant's private airfield to determine wh~plane loaded 
~-~-----
with marijuana was going to land and unload. To get to their 
/ 
observation post, the police ~d to cross a dike, ram through one 
gate, cut the chain lock on another, and cut or cross several 
posted fences. Having done this, the police saw a plane land and 
defendant and several others unload a shipment of marijuana. The 
state court applied the Katz test to hold that defendant had 
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in the airfield to 
which society was willing to give 4th Amendment protection. I 
50 cLc di~e. A person's right to privacy under the 4th Amendment is 
3 not co-extensive with his right to privacy under state trespass 
laws. The landing of a plane and the unloading of its cargo in 
the out of doors is hardly the kind of innately private activity 
that the 4th Amendment protects. The police conduct here was 
hardly commendable and probably violated a number of state laws. 
However, because there were no legitimate privacy interests in 
the defendant's activity in this place, the government intrusion 
does not violate the 4th Amendment. 





There is an appealing argument against this per se rule. 
However, I believe that it runs into problems in application. 
Defendants argue that there is no reason to assume that there may 
never be reasonable expectations of privacy in an open field. 
They argue that before the Hester doctrine applies, each field 
must be analyzed to determine whether it is an "open field" 
within the meaning of that doctrine. In their view, Katz 
provides the proper test. The first prong of the test is easy: 
the field owner need only make known his subjective expectations 
of privacy. The second prong is more difficult: at what point 
does the owner's efforts to secure his privacy interests give 
rise to 4th Amendment protection? 
The most justifiable and easily applicable rule under 
this second prong would be the following: if the field owner 
lawfully has secured the field from both public view and public 
access, he has established an expectation of privacy protected by -
the 4th Amendment. I!_ the field is visible from public land, or ~· 
from neighboring land~there are no privacy interests cogniz~le ~­
under the 4th Amendment. This rule is consistent with the noti~ 
that what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not subject 
to 4th Amendment protection. If there are no 4th Amendment 
interests in a particular field, it is constitutionally 
insignificant that the police choose to view the field by 
trespassing on the owner's land. Protection from such government 
intrusion may be forthcoming under the trespass laws but not 
under the exclusionary rule. 
There are several proble~h ~pproach. First, 
assuming that the field is not visible from adjacent land, once 
the owner manifests his subjective expectations of privacy by 
posting no trespassing signs, what more must he do to secure 4th 
Amendment protection? A visible sign is sufficient to ensure 
against intrusion under the trespass laws, but even defendants ao 
not argue that this alone is sufficient to create 4th Amendment 
protection. Where along the spectrum from visible sign to 
police-proof barrier does 4th Amendment protection attach? 
Second, if only some parts of the field are visible from adjacent 
land and others are not, is the field broken up into "open 
fields" and "secured fields" according to visibility? Third, the 
Government in Oliver cites some state laws that give government 
officials such as game wardens specific authority to enter 
private posted lands to inspect for violations of state wildlife 
laws. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 149.090, 150,090 (Bobbs-
Merrill repl. 1980 & 1982 Cum. Supp.) If the 4th Amendment 
protects open fields, I assume that such entries would be 
unconstitutional without an administrative warrant. See, e.g., 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 u.s. 523 (1967) ~ Marshall v. 
Barlow's Inc., 436 u.s. 307 (1978). 
Finally, and perhaps most problematic, is the test for 
cognizable privacy interests, which asks whether the owner 
legally has secured the field from public view. Even the most 
secluded field is visible from the air by the public and the 
- --- .. government alike. Air surveillance generally does not constitute 
trespass as long as the aircraft 1s not flown too low. See, e .. , 
United States v. Causby, 328 u.s. 256 (1946) (flight by aircraft 
in air space above private property is trespass only if it enters 
the "immediate reaches" of the property and interferes with the 
owner's use of the land)~ United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 
1380-81 (CA9 1980) (helicopter surveillance of private property 
that could be seen only from the air is not a 4th Amendment 
violation)~ Restatement (Second) Torts §159 (2) (flights above 
500 feet are not within "immediate reaches"~ flights within 50 
feet are). The fact that open fields, unlike houses, barns, or 
factories, are visible from the air suggests that the more common 
sense approach would be a per se rule that there are no 
legitimate expectations of privacy in an open field. To hold 
otherwise merely would drive government surveillance to the skies 
and encourage a potentially more obnoxious kind of intrusion. 
C. Standing Question 
The Government in Oliver arguably presents a standing 
question. It argues that because Oliver had leased the field in 
question to others, he has no right to assert whatever 4th 
Amendment rights might exist in that field. This Court has 
indicated that "standing" questions under the 4th Amendment shall 
be considered as part of the substantive question whether a 
particular individual had a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the area searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 u.s. 128 (1978) If 
the Court adopts the per se rule that there are no 4th Amendment 
interests in an open field, resolution of this question with 
respect to Oliver will be unnecessary. If it does not, I think 
that the Government's "standing" argument is flawed. 
If, as the Government claims, the marijuana crop was 
Oliver's, and he maintained the field, the trespass signs, the 
gate, etc., I believe that he retained a sufficient privacy stake 
in the field to assert whatever 4th Amendment interests existed. 
The fact that Oliver gave the keys to the field gate to another 
does not open the field to government intrusion. If the police 
had been invitees of Oliver's lessees, this would be a different 
matter. But such is not the case. 
D. Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity 
The Government in Oliver argues that if this Court 
rejects the per se rule discussed above, it should apply a lesser 
standard of cause that will allow police to make warrantless 
entries onto private fields once they have a reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity. Under this scheme, the police first must 
determine whether the owner of the field has manifested privacy 
expectations in the field that are protected by the 4th 
Amendement. If he has, they must determine whether there is a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justifies 
government intrusion. The rationale supporting this lesser 
standard of cause is another per se rule: even the most private 
fields are never as deserving of 4th Amendment protection as are 
houses, offices, barns, etc. Althought this per se rule is 
appealing for the same reasons as the first, it does little to 
clear up the confusion concerning application of the 4th 
Amendment to open fields. This scheme still requires a difficult 
analysis to determine whether 4th Amendment interests exist in a 
particular field. If the answer to that question is yes, then 
those interests are treated as a special class of interests 
requiring only reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause 
and dispensing with the warrant requirement. Such a result will 
only contribute to the already needless complexity of 4th 
Amendment law. 
E. Curtilage Area 
Despite the benefit of avoiding complexity in 4th 
Amendment law, I believe that the open curtilage of a residence 
is distinguishable from an open field for purposes of 4th 
Amendment analysis. Curtilage, as used here, is an area 
immediately surrounding the house that is used for family 
purposes. --- Because of its common law connection with the home, the Courts of Appeal have held that this area is imbued with 
expectations of privacy protected by the 4th Amendment. See, 
e.g., United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992, 993 (CA4 1981); 
United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451, 453 (CAS), cert. denied, 
440 U.S. 972 (1979). The curtilage area often is open to public 
view so that the expectations of privacy may not be great in any 
given instance. I believe that the Katz test should be applied ? 
to each case involving this area to determine whether the ~ 
particular government intrusion violated any legitimate 
~~~-~ 
----------~-----~ ------
expectations of privacy. CA4 adopted a similar approach in Van 
Dyke, 643 F.2d at 994 (Butzner, J.). 
" 
' \ 
Under the Katz test, the open curtilage area in a 
particular case may be protected by the 4th Amendment from 
physical intrusion by police. This may be so even if the police 
can see the open area from the outside. The only justification 
for this is the historic association of this area with the home. 
This association suggests that there may be other privacy 
interests, closely related to privacy interests in the home, that 
may be intruded on by government trespass. This is roughly 
analogous to viewing a marijuana plant in the window of a home: 
although criminal evidence is in plain view from an unprotected 
area, the police cannot trespass in the home to view the evidenc 
more closely or to seize it. However, they may use what appears 
in plain view to establish the probable cause necessary to secur 
a warrant. The same does not hold true for an open field that 
lies beyond the curtilage of a residence. This is so because 
open fields generally have no connection with privacy interests 
that are likely to exist in the home. ~ ~ 
v ~ 
The decision in United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093 ~ 
(CAS 1982) , which is being held for the decision in these two 
cases (No. 82-508), is explicable under the distinction between 
curtilage and open fields. In Dunn, defendants were 
manufacturing drugs on a 198 acre ranch. The entire ranch was 
surrounded by a perimeter fence. There were interior fences, -----------including one around the house and one around a nearby barn. 
Police penetrated both the perimeter fence and the interior 
, •• ,.. 'l,, 
fences around the house and barn. During this trespass, they 
placed surveillance equipment in the driveway within the interior 
fences, and they looked inside the nearby barn. CAS found that 
the ar~a within the interior fences was within the curtilage 
area, that privacy interests in that area were protected under 
~
the 4th Amendment, and that the evidence obtained by trespassing 
on this area was obtained in violation of that amendment and 
should be excluded. CAS applied the Katz test to determine that 
the curtilage area was protected by the 4th Amendment, and its 
decision in that case appears reasonable. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I recommend that the Court adopt a per se rule that 
there are no legitimate privacy interests in an open field that 
lies beyond the curtilage area of a residence. This rule accords 
with this Court's repeated statements that the 4th Amendment 
protects only those privacy interests that are reasonably and 
justifiably held. 
t._,P'r-
82-15 OLIVER v. UNITED STATj~~~· 
82-1273 MAINE v. THORNTON f~· Argued 11/9/83 
.• 









7?"' ~ -~~~- 7- &« -c.c 't ~ ~ 
"-~ - -. 
l~!y, ~$ wep~~k:.c.P /~ 
C/- ~~~4'~ ~ • 
~~~~~~.e.f 
~~~~h~\1 
( ~ b-1- '14t...-·~  ). -
/~ ~ ~ I~-4~..££L¢-
 •. ~ ~ ~~~,.....£A..~ 
~~) 
Jf~ ~~'-~A-t_..;_ 
~ ~I t--1-~ ,z;]jijl6-e_ d.<A-
~~' 
~~ ~ 13:e~~"-" ~ 




~ 32.,-/273) . 
~~~~ 
~ ~~~-, . 
· ~~~n• ~ 












a.--z- ·'~ 4 ¢ !:! c2~-(; c-u{. 
0 1-t J . "' i ~ J...c ~ ;;~ ~t-r ~ ~-a..- .. 4~
~,t..,;~~~~ 
















~ ( ,J cSa;  d~.d--. 
~.j...,__ ~ 1-tJaa~~) 
: 
. .. 
1?2.- 1'3'"~ ~~ ,_!:;.2d. ~ 
f'2-IZ73 J"'/~ J-
/fad~(l~~): ~ ca~J;;;M.; 
,I.e,~~~~ 
,~. ~~~ ut/2•u.£J tt,e4f/ J4u. ~ ~ 
:~~. ~~ ~ H-t- ~ 
~a j 






I - - - - . A ~. '' ~~
:( LAAA ~~.-c. v-~ ¥ '::f . 
I ~ f~-~~/d..t 
~~ 
~-- .. ~~'.' 




I ~t>-/ ~LL)~ 




f211'* ~·IS"' (t,- 'J) 
&.v f'2 .... /?.7!> ( ~ .... 3 
No. 82-15 Oliver v. United States Conf. llLll/83 
F2-L'Zi3'J11~ .... ~~ 
The Chief Justice C2f1-- ~ 2 -I :;- · ~ ~ B' .2 - 1 2. 7 '3 
~~ a-... ~ ... /'?:,e"_,4_,•i a-~ {~1. ~~~j 
da ~r- ~a_ ~~~ 




Justice Brennan ~ g~l !;,' a.H 8' Z - J 2... 75 
~ l<.d--!)., ~~ /~ 
~~~~-~--~~ 
~  ~ ~ ~ -,.< ~· -4 .e« ~ ~ ""--'<._ 
~~~b-f~. 
 g.. ~~~.!&,.d.< 




Justice White 2Lfj - 82 -Is- ~. 9' 2 - J 2.7 3 
¥u.~s ~~ 
~~A,L/e.... ~ ~~ ~ ~ 
J 
~~~~-'~ (9~) 
~ 1/IA._~..a ' F ~ ¥ 1:::!-
?jevu._'~·~~l!eJL~.~' ~~ ~ 






Justice Blackmun an~ ~ j ~ i!L ~ ~ ~, ...._ 
~~~-- "-t>~l~k..r--~ 







Justice Powell ~~ 7 :::ea::;;1 
J~~~~ 
~d ~~ ~-"-:f~ . 
$~"-~-~· 
Justice Rehnquist l:£f.J ~ 9--~ 
7~,k.r ~~ ~ ~-





Justice Stevens ~ q t::'Lfl ~ 
~.5/cl- ~tr/c 
~ ~4//./3· 
Justice O'Connor a.;-~ 9-~ 












David DATE: Nov. 28, 1983 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
82-15 Oliver v. United States 
82-1273 Maine v. Thornton 
Over the holidays, I found time to review with 
some care the first draft (11/23) of our opinion in these 
two cases. I am quite pleased with the draft. 
I have made changes - chiefly editorial ones -
throughout the draft, and asked an occasional question. I 
think the basic organization and structure of the opinion 
is consistent with my views and those of a majority of the 
Court. 
I do want you to take a close look at what I 
think should be Part III (p. 20), commencing with the 
first full paragraph on p. 22 down to Part IV on p. 25. 
In these pages, you distinguish the no trespassing law of 
property from the privacy right guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment. It is necessary to make this distinction, and 
you do so very well - particularly on pages 20, 21. My 
impression, however, is that Part III would be more 
2. 
ef feet i ve if it were a couple of pages shorter. The 
distinction addressed is an obvious one, but it is 
necessary to explain why. Please try to summarize what 
you now have in pages 22-25. Some of what is now in the 
text can be retained in one or more footnotes. 
As you will remember, the procedure from now on 
is as follows: I would like to see your revision of Part 
III and any subsequent changes that you may make in the 
remainder of the draft. It would facilitate my looking at 
these if the changes were marked in the margin. Then, the 
draft should go to your "editor" who should perform the 
function generally of an officer a good law review. 
Again, if substantive changes are made I would like to see 
them. If, however, editorial changes only are proposed, 
you and your editor should reconcile these and have the 
print shop downstairs do a first chambers draft. Copies 
of this should go to all four of the clerks as well as to 
me. I wi 11 let you know promptly whether I have changes 
in the printed chambers draft, and we proceed from there 
to a "first draft" for circulation. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 




To: JUSTICE POWELL 
I 
Re: Justice O'Connor's Memorandum on Oliver v. US, No. 82-15 
1. I do not think that Justice O'Connor' p first sugges-
l . ·~ 1 I 
tion would clarify the opinion. Apparently she wishes to empha-
' size that a polic~ search of an area is not a "search" within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless that search invades le-
gitimate expectations of privacy. 
This point is important when considering whether the 
Fourth Amendment applies to a police investigatory procedure 
which is not obviously a "search" in the common use of the term 
- procedures such as wiretapping, ~Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967) ~ a "canine sniff" of luggage, ~United States 
v. Place, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2644-2645 (1983) (per JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR), or chemical testing of cocaine, ~, United States v. 
Jacobsen, No. 82-1167. The Court may decide that such procedures 
are not "searches" because they intrude upon no legitimate expec-
tation of privacy. 
It seems less helpful to state that search of an open 
field is not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amend---- \ 
ment. Most citizens would be surprised to learn that when police 
p~ ins~~~for marijuana, they are not ~~ucting a 
~ ~earc~." Rather, the question in Oliver is more simply formu- 2 p~-./ 
~A~ated to be whether the search of open fields is reasonable al- j ~ 
I'-~" . 
~ though conducted without a warrant. 
page 2. 
If such a search is always reasonable because no legiti-
mate privacy interests are invaded, perhaps it is in effect not a 
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. However, I 
do not see how this latter formulation clarifies analysis of the 
case. While legal use of terms sometimes diverges widely from 
ordinary usage, I do not think that a 
1
donstitutional ter~ such as 
"search" should be turned into technical formula when the common _____, 
understanding of the word serves equally well. 
2. To incorporate Justice O'Connor's second suggestion, 
footnote 10 might be revised to read: " •.. and we have occasion 
here to consider neither the scope of this doctrine nor the de-
gree of protection afforded the curtilage, as opposed to the horne 
itself, by the Fourth Amendment." 
'.t 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
,jltJlrtutt <!flttt.d ltf tfrt 'Jlnittb ,jt:dts 
11htsfrittgLm. ~. <!f. 2ll.;t~~ 
December 7, 1983 
Re: Nos. 82-15 and 1273-0liver v. U.S., et al 
Dear Lewis: 
"In due course" I will circulate a dissent. 
Sincerely, 
C(lt 1 . 
T.M. 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.h;tt.mtt <qGurl Gf f4t~b _jtatt_s 
'JJulfin¢~ ~. <q. 2llgt,.~ 
December 7 , 198 3 
Nos. 82-15 & 82-1273 
Oliver v . United States 
& Maine v . Thornton 
Dear Lewis , 
I will await the dissent . 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
;iupum~ aflturlltf f4~ ~nit~~ ~tattg 
..-ultittghm. ~. <!f. 2llgt'!~ 
December 8, 1983 
Re: 82-15 - Oliver v. United States 
82-1273 - Maine v. Thornton 
Dear Lewis: 
I will wait for Thurgood's dissent. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Powell 




lfp/ss 12/08/83 OCON SALLY-POW 
Open Fields Cases 
Dear Sandra: 
Since we spoke briefly yesterday, I have read 
with some care your letter of December 7. As always, I am 
grateful to you for a private communication on a draft 
opinion. I recall last Term how helpful your suggestions 
were in Dirks. 
I do have some reservations that I share with 
you as to the possible changes you asked me consider in 
this case. Your thought for a change in the first two 
sentences of page 5 is, as I understand it, that some 
police investigatory procedures are not a "search" in the 
common understanding of that term, procedures such as 
wiretapping, "canine sniffing" and chemical testing of 
2. 
cocaine. In such cases, we decide that they are not 
"searches" because they intrude upon no legitimate 
expectation of privacy. I have thought that when police 
inspect a field looking for marijuana, they are conducting 
a search. Thus, if my understanding is correct, the 
question in Oliver simply is whether an open field search 
is reasonable although conducted without a warrant. 
'. 
Dear Thurgood: 
December 12, 1983 
82-15 Oliver v. United States 
82-1273 Maine v. Thornton 
Since you expect to write a nissent in these 
cases, I want you to know that ! may make a number of 
chanqes in my first draft. 





..JU STICE WI LLIAM H . R EH N QU IST 
~ttpt'ttttt <!J~ttri ~f Urt ~tb .fbdts 
-asJrittgtott. ~. <!J. 20.?'!$ 
December 16, 1983 
Re: Nos. 82-15 & 82-1273 Oliver v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
You would make me happy enough to join your opinion in 
this case if you could adopt the following suggestions. 
Each is premised on the idea that the "reasonableness" of 
someone's expectation of privacy goes to the issue of 
whether or not there was a search at all, as opposed to the 
"reasonableness" of a search or seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment, which depends upon whether probable cause exists 
or whether a warrant is required. 
On page 5 could you delete the second sentence, which 
deals with warrantless searches, rather than with the 
question of whether a particular governmental intrusion is a 
search at all? 
On page 10, in the sentence beginning on the third line 
of the page, substitute for the phrase "warrantless search," 
the phrase "a governmental intrusion." 
On page 10, in the first sentence of the first full 
paragraph on the page, substitute for the phrase "nor is 
search of a field ' unreasonable'" , the phrase "nor is a 
governmental intrusion a ' search. ' " 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
December 20, 1983 
United States 
Here is a substantially revised c'iraf.t of. my open 
fields opinion. 
I have restructured it with the view to obtaining 
your join, at least for parts of it. I am grateful to vou 
for makinq me focus more sharnlv on the lan~uaqe of the 
Amendment itsPlf. I do think it dPairablP to show that de-
velopments in the law of Fourth Amen1ment doctrine are con-
sistent w'th both the lanquaqe and the intent of the 
Founders. 










December 20, 1983 
82-15 Oliver v. United States 
81-1273 Maine v. ~hornton 
In view of your suggestions, and some conversation 
both with Bill Rehnquist and Byron, I have made substantial 
revisions particularly in the structure of my opinion in 
these two cases. The purpose primarilY was to place qreater 
emphasis on the language of the Fourth Amendment it~elf. 





.._ ______ , ...... ,..~"---------:4'-.~---~-·-·----~---------~-~.--
·~ ,•·~· 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u.prtmt <!fouri d tlt't 'J'ni.ttb ~tatt.s 
jla.s!rittgton. ~. <!f. 2ll&fJ!~ 
December 20, 1983 
I 
Re: Nos. 82-15 & 82-1273 Oliver v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF' 
,juvrtntt <ijMtrt cf tqt ~ittb ,jtatt.s-
'~lhudrhtgton, ~. <If. 2llbf~~ 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
December 21, 1933 
No. 82-15 Oliver v. United States 
No. 82-1273 Maine v. Thornton 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.§uvrttttt <!}ourlo-f tqt ~ttittb ~httts 
'~llhtsltitt¢cn. ~. <!}. 2llp'!.;l 
Re: No. 82-15 - Oliver v. United States 
No. 82-1273 - Maine v. Thornton 
Dear Lewis: 
December 21, 1983 
/ 
I am, of course, still with you as to the result in 
these cases. I have concluded, however, that I shall 
wait to see what the forthcoming dissent has to say 





cc: The Conference 
)· 
.:ittpTtntt <!Jlturillf tlt't 'Jni.tth ;ibdt.&' 
Jlulfinghnt. ~. <!J. 20~~~ 
CHAMBERS 0 F 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE December 29 1 1983 
Re: Oliver and Thornton 
Dear Lewis, 
I join in Parts I and II of your draft op1n1on in 
these cases. These Parts dispose of the issue before us, 
and it seems to me that there is no need to deal with the 
expectation of privacy matter. However reasonable a 
landowner's expectations of privacy may be, I doubt that 
those expectations could convert a field into a "house" or 
an "effect." Furthermore, if privacy expectations are 
determinative, where a landowner takes steps to keep 
intruders off his property sufficient to make entry a 
criminal trespass and hence to invoke the ultimate sanction 
of the local law, I would have some difficulty saying that 
his expectations of privacy are not reasonably founded. I 
shall write a few words along this line. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
,, ~ It • •• 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
j\nprmu <!j:ourl of t4t~b ,jbdtll 
~ag4htgto14 ~. <!):. 2ll,?~~ 
December 30, 1983 
RE: 82-15} - Oliver v. United States 
81-1273} - Maine v. Thornton 




Copies to the Conference 
''!'>• I 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE Wt< . ..J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
.§npumt <!fcnrl cf t£rt ~h .§ta!ts 
._uJri:nghtn. ~. QI. 20p'!~ 
March 26, 198 4 
No. 82-15 ) Oliver v. United 
) States 
) 
No. 82-1273) Maine v. Thornton 
Dear Thurgood: 





Copies to the Conference 
CHA ... ISI!:RS 0,-
..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.8npr.tnu OfDUri crf tJr.t ~~b .8tat.t• 
,ruJrtqton, ~.Of. 2ll.?,.~ 
March 26, 1984 
Re: 82-15 - Oliver v. United States 
82-1273 - Maine v. Thornton 
Dear Thurgood: 




Copies to the Conference 
, .Jr ~-. ~ 
lfp/ss 03/27/84 FIELDS SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: David DATE: March 27, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
82-15 and 82-1273 Open Fields Case 
At horne last tonight (Monday) , I took a look at 
TM's dissent before retiring. Much of it is juvenile. 
There is, however, some substance and a reply is 
indicated. 
Without making any attempt to outline a reply, I 
merely comment on what is said by TM as one reads through 
his opinion: 
1. Our opinion is characterized as "startling" 
although it relies primarily on Hester, written by Holmes 
in 1924, and not since discredited. Indeed, Hester is not 
mentioned until p. 10 of the dissent, and then the effort 
to distinguish it is based purely on speculation. 
2. It is said that our decision is 
"inconsistent" with previous decisions. The first one 
cited is Katz with a comment suggesting that the Court --
held a "telephone booth" to be protected by the Fourth 
Arnendrnen t" • p. 2. Yet, as we noted, and as the dissent 
2. 
finally says on p. 4, only the conversation of a person 
was protected - not his presence in the booth. 
The dissent refers to the automobile cases, 
though its purpose is not entirely clear. None of these 
h t t d h • h ~~II ' ' II as pro ec e anyt 1ng t at was~n pla1n v1ew , and 
everything that has been protected fairly could be 
considered an "effect" of a person. 
3. Part II of the dissent has more substance, 
as it is based on the "positive law" of trespass. 
Finally, in Part III, the "rule" proposed by the dissent 
is: 
a fashion sufficient to 
criminal trespass under 
• is protected by the 
"Private land marked in 
render entry thereon a 
the law of the state • 
Fourth Amendment". p. 12 
Our opinion correctly states that the trespass 
laws are designed primarily to protect economic interests. 
The dissent cites no cases, English or American, that 
holds that the protection against unlawful "search and 
seizure" contemplated by the Fourth Amendment, and the 
English common law, was based on or related to trespass 
laws. Also, David, I am not at all sure that our trespass 
laws require - as the dissent suggests - any specific kind 
3. 
0~~(, 
of fencing or posting. You might take a look 
laws in Kentucky and Maine. ~ ~~......,~ 
"'1 ... c:...c ···~ 4- ....-<... 
As Katz said, the Fourth primarily protects 
.~ ....... ~'~ 
people - in their homes, offices, and even in their 
A 
automobiles. It does not protect "places" apart from 
people. 
It is interesting to look at the examples cited 
in the dissent as to "privacy" uses of open forests and 
fields that it says should be protected: places to "meet 
lovers", gather for "worship", engage in "creative 
,.~" endeavor" and take "solitary walks". Refer to these, 
David, to illustrate the reaching of the dissent for some 
privacy basis. The dissent does mention "agricultural 
~businesses", and trespass laws no doubt were intended to 
- .... prevent the stealing o~~ ;.:;) 
Historically, trespass laws were primarily 
designed to prevent poachers and hunters. This is 
particularly true in England where hunting or poaching (I 
believe whether the land is posted or not) may bring a 
jail sentence. Trespass laws also are intended to protect 
forest land from fires, from property being "trashed", and 
to prevent the cutting or trees or the gathering of 
4. 
firewood, etc. Trespass laws simply protect interests 
diffferentfrom the privacy of one's person and effects. 
It is curious that the dissent should say that 
its rule is one easily understood and enforced, whereas 
ours will open the flood gates to litigation. 
the dissent was written by a "city boy or 
Apparently 
girl". It 
ignores the variations as to the size, shape and location 
of land ownership. It is an historic fact that Lord 
Fairfax enjoyed a grant from the Queen, prior to the 
Revolution, of millions of acres. There are many private 
holdings in this country today of tens of thousands - and 
even hundreds of thousands of acres. It would be absurd 
to recognize a privacy interest in all acreage to enable 
lovers to meet, and the conducting of outdoor worship. 
And despite the length of this memo, David, limit 





JUSTICE H A RRY A . B L ACKMUN 
~uuu <!Jouri ~ tfr~ ~ui:Ub .ihttts 
,.MJ:rittgtott. ~. <!J. 21lpJ!.$ 
Re: No. 82-15 - Oliver v. United States 
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Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-15 
RAY E. OLIVER, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[December -, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The "open fields" doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in 
Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924), pennits police 
officers to enter and search a field without a warrant. We 
granted certiorari in these cases to clarify confusion that has 
arisen as to the continued vitality of the doctrine. 
I 
No. 82-15. Acting on reports that marijuana was being 
raised on the farm of petitioner Oliver, two narcotics agents 
of the Kentucky State Police went to the farm to investi-
gate. 1 Arriving at the farm, they drove past petitioner's 
house to a locked gate with a "No Trespassing" sign. A foot-
path led around one side of the gate. The agents walked 
around the gate and along the road for several hundred 
yards, passing a barn and a parked camper. At that point, 
someone standing in front of the camper shouted, "No hunt-
ing is allowed, come back here." The officers shouted back 
that they were Kentucky State Police officers, but found no 
one when they returned to the camper. The officers re-
sumed their investigation of the farm and found a field of 
marijuana over a mile from petitioner's home. 
' It is conceded that the police did not have a warrant authorizing the 
search, that there was no probable cause for the search and that no excep-
tion to the warrant requirement is applicable. 
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Petitioner was arrested anq indicted for "manufactur[ing]" 
a "controlled substance." 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). After a 
pretrial hearing, the District Court suppressed evidence of 
the discovery of the marijuana fields. Applying Katz v. 
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967), the court found that 
petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the fields would 
remain private because petitioner "had done all that could be 
expected of him to assert his privacy in the area of farm that 
was searched." He had posted "no trespassing" signs at reg-
ular intervals and had locked the gate to the entrance of the 
farm's center. Pet. App., at 2~24. Further, the court 
noted that the fields themselves are highly secluded: they are 
bounded on all sides by woods, fences and embankments and 
cannot be seen from any point of public access. The court 
concluded that this was not an "open" field that invited casual 
intrusion. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed the district court. 686 F. 2d 356 (1982). 2 The 
court concluded that Katz, upon which the District Court re-
lied, had not impaired the vitality of the open fields doctrine 
of Hester. Rather, the open fields doctrine was entirely 
compatible with Katz's emphasis on privacy. The court rea-
soned that the "human relations that create the need for pri-
vacy do not ordinarily take place" in open fields, and that the 
property owner's common law right to exclude trespassers is 
insufficiently linked to privacy to warrant the Fourth 
Amendment's protection. Id., at 360.3 We granted certio-
rari. - U. S. - (1983). 
2 A panel of the Sixth Circuit had affirmed the suppression order. 657 F. 
2d 85 (1981). 
3 The four dissenting judges contended that the open fields doctrine did 
not apply where, as in this case, "reasonable efforts have been made to ex-
clude the public." 686 F. 2d, at 372. To that extent, the dissent consid-
ered that Katz v. United States , supra, implicitly had overruled previous 
holdings of this Court. The dissent then concluded that petitioner had es-
tablished a "reasonable expectaton of privacy" under the Katz standard. 
82-15-0PINION 
OLIVER v. UNITED STATES 3 
No. 82-1273. After receiving an anonymous tip that mari-
juana was being grown in the woods behind respondent 
Thornton's residence, two police officers entered the woods 
by a path between this residence and a neighboring house. 
They followed a footpath through the woods until they 
reached two marijuana patches fenced With chicken wire. 
Later, the officers determined that the patches were on the 
property of respondent, obtained a warrant to search the 
property and seized the marijuana. On the basis of this evi-
dence, respondent was arrested and indicted. 
The trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress 
the fruits of the second search. The warrant for this search 
was premised on information that the police had obtained 
during their previous warrantless search, that the court 
found to be unreasonable. 4 "No Trespassing" signs and the 
secluded location of the marijuana patches evinced a reason-
able expectation of privacy. Therefore, the "open fields" 
doctrine did not apply. 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 453 A. 2d 
489 (1982). It agreed with the trial court that the correct 
question was whether the search "is a violation of privacy on 
which the individual justifiably relied," id., at 493, and that 
the search violated respondent's privacy. The court also 
agreed that the "open fields" doctrine did not justify the 
search. That doctrine applies, according to the court, only 
when officers are lawfully present on property and observe 
"open and patent" activity. ld., at 495. In this case, the 
officers had trespassed upon defendant's property, and the 
respondent had made every effort to conceal his activity. 
We granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1983). 5 
Judge Lively also wrote separately to argue that the open fields doctrine 
applied only to lands that could be viewed by the public. 
'The court also discredited other information, supplied by a confidential 
informant, upon which the police had based their warrant application. 
5 Respondent contends that the decision below rests upon adequate and 
independent state law grounds. We do not read that decision, however, 
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II 
As the courts below recogriized; the touchstone of Fourth 
Amendment analysis is the question whether a person has a 
"constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 360 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). The Fourth Amendment does not protect the 
merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only "those 
expectations that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able.'" Id., at 361. See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 
735, 740-741 (1979). 
A 
No single factor determines whether an individual legiti-
mately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place 
should be free of government intrusion not authorized by 
warrant. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 152-153 
(1978) (POWELL, J., concurring) To discern whether a war-
rantless search is "reasonable," this Court has balanced soci-
ety's interest in effective law enforcement against those pri-
as excluding the evidence because the search violated the state constitu-
tion. The Maine Supreme Court referred only to the Fourth Amendment 
of the federal Constitution and purported to apply the Katz test; the prior 
state cases that the court cited also construed the federal Constitution. In 
any case, the Maine Supreme Court did not articulate an independent state 
ground with the clarity required by Michigan v. Long, -- U. S. --
(1983). 
Contrary to respondent's assertion, we do not review here the state 
courts' finding as a matter of "fact" that the area searched was not an "open 
field." Rather, the question before us is the appropriate legal standard for 
determining whether search of that area without a warrant was lawful 
under the federal Constitution. 
The conflict between the two cases that we review here is illustrative of 
the confusion the "open fields" doctrine has generated among the state and 
federal courts. Compare, e. g., State v. Byers, 359 So. 2d 84 (La. 1978) 
(refusing to apply open fields doctrine); State of Florida v. Brady, 406 So. 
2d 1093 (Fla. 1981) (same), with United States v. Case, 669 F. 2d 46, 50-51 
(CA2 1982); United States v. Freie, 545 F. 2d 1217 (CA9 1976); United 
States v. Brown, 473 F . 2d 952, 954 (CA5 1973); Atwell v. United States, 
414 F . 2d 136, 138 (CA5 1969). 
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vacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. E. g., 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654 (1979); United States 
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 554-555 (1976). In as-
sessing the degree to which a search infringes upon individ-
ual privacy, the Court has given weight to such factors as the 
intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, e. g. 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1977), the uses 
to which the individual has put a location, e. g., Jones v. 
United States, 362 U. S. 257, 265 (1960), and our societal un-
derstanding that certain areas, such as the home, deserve the 
most scrupulous protection from government invasion, 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980). 
In this light, the rule of Hester v. United States, supra, is 
best understood as providing that an individual may not le-
gitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of 
doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding 
the home. See also Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western 
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861, 865 (1974). We reaffirm that 
rule today. 
The rule accords well with the legitimate scope of individ-
ual privacy as expressed by the Framers in the language of 
the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment indicates with 
some precision the places and items encompassed by its pro-
tections. As Justice Holmes explained for the Court in his 
characteristically laconic style: "[T]he special protection ac-
corded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open 
fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as 
old as the common law." Hester v. United States, 265 U. S., 
at 59. 6 
8 In this respect, it is suggestive that John Madison's proposed draft of 
what became the Fourth Amendment preserved "[t]he rights of the people 
to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other 
property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures. . . . " See N. 
Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution 100, n. 77 (1937) (emphasis added). Congress's 
~d·tf,J o+ 
C (lt)'~{.-1 ~ S~j'(ff(o., 
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The understanding of the right to privacy embodied in our 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence confirms this interpreta-
tion of the Amendment's langtiage. The Amendment fosters 
individual autonomy and relationships of trust such as friend-
ship and family by establishing enclaves free from arbitrary 
government interference. For example, the Court since the 
enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed "the over-
riding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been em-
bedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic." 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 601. 7 See also 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961); 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 293, 
313 (1972). 
The "open fields" doctrine is true to this conception of the 
right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 
For open fields do not generally provide the setting for those 
intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter 
from government interference or surveillance. There is no 
societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, 
revisions of Madison's proposal broadened the scope of the Amendment in 
some respects, id., at 100-103; however, the term "effects" is less inclusive 
than "property" and cannot be said to encompass open fields. 
This Court frequently has relied on the explicit language of the amend-
ment as delineating the scope of its affirmative protections. See, e. g., 
Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 426 (1981) (opinion of Stewart, J.); 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 589--590; Alderman v. United States, 
394 u. s. 165, 178-180 (1969). 
7 The Fourth Amendment's protection of offices and commercial build-
ings is also based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the 
history of the Amendment. The Fonrth .. \m.endment was prompted-in-
Uwg-e measure by-the-pre-Revolutionaey abuses-of--gen~al wan:ants,-the 
'~ffensiveness-[Gf--wftieh-}-was aentely felt by the merehants and 
busi-FleSSffle&-whese-premises-and.-pl' · ttlianee 
~al parliamefttaey-:reventle measw es that mest ilTitated-the. 
c · . arshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 311 (1978).f- -In-
light ofthese origjns, we held that thQ ban eft wanantless semches applies SL _ 
tJJ eemme1 :cl.ID: ptetnise!t Id a.t..~ ll 3~ also G.M. Leasing Corp. v. 
United States , 429 U. S. 338, 355 (1977) 
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such as the cultivaton of crops, that occur in open fields. 
Further, as a practical matter these lands usually are accessi-
ble to the public and the police in ·ways that a home or com-
mercial structure would not be. It is not generally true that 
fences or no trespassing signs effectively bar the public from 
viewing open fields in rural areas. And both petitioner Oli-
ver and respondent Thornton concede that the public and po-
lice lawfully may survey lands from the air. 8 For these rea-
sons, the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not 
an expectation that "society recognizes as reasonable." 9 
The historical underpinnings of the "open fields" doctrine 
also demonstrate that the doctrine is consistent with respect 
for "reasonable expectations of privacy." As Justice 
Holmes, writing for the Court, observed in Hester v. United 
States, 265 U. S., at 57, the common law distinguished "open 
fields" from the "curtilage," the land immediately surround-
ing and associated with the home. See 4 Blackstone, Com-
mentaries, at 225. The distinction implies that only the cur-
tilage, not the neighboring "open fields," warrants the 
Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home. At 
common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the 
intimate activity associated with the "sanctity of a man's 
home and the privacies of life." Boyd v. United States, 116 
8 Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15, 58. See, e. g., United States v. Allen, 675 F. 
2d 1373, 1380-1381 (CA9 1980); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 
1078, 1081 (WD Mich. 1980). In practical terms, petitioner Oliver's and 
respondent Thornton's analysis merely would require law enforcement offi-
cers to use aerial surveillance to gather the information necessary to obtain 
a warrant or to justify warrantless entry onto the property. It is hard to 
see how such a requirement would advance legitimate privacy interests. 
9 The Fourth Amendment provides ample protection to activities in the 
"open fields" that might implicate an individual's privacy. An individual 
who enters a place defined to be "public" for Fourth Amendment analysis 
does not lose all claims to privacy or personal security. Cf. Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 766-767 (1979) (BURGER, C. J ., concurring). For 
example, the individual cannot be arrested without probable cause. 
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976). 
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U. S. 616, 630 (1886). Thus, courts have extended Fourth 
Amendment protection to the curtilage; and they have de-
fined the curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to 
the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably 
may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home 
will remain private. See, e. g., United States v. van Dyke, 
643 F. 2d 992, 993-994 (CA4 1981); United States v. Wil-
liams, 581 F. 2d 451, 453 (CA5 1978); Care v. United States, 
231 F. 2d 22, 25 (CAlO), cert. denied, 351 U. S. 932 (1956). 
Conversely, the common law implies, as we reaffirm today, 
that no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open 
fields. 
We conclude, from the text of the Fourth Amendment and 
from the historical and contemporary understanding of its 
purposes, that an individual has no legitimate expectation 
that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion 
by government officers. 
B 
Petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton contend, to the 
contrary, that the circumstances of a search sometimes may 
indicate that reasonable expectations of privacy were vio-
lated; and that courts therefore should analyze these circum-
stances on a case-by-case basis. We do not agree with these 
contentions. 
The case-by-case approach does not provide a workable ac-
commodation between the needs of law enforcement and the 
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Under this 
approach, police officers would have to guess before every 
search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently 
high, posted a sufficient number of warning signs, or located 
contraband in an area sufficiently secluded to establish a 
right of privacy. The lawfulness of a search would turn on 
"[a] highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of 
ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nu-
ances and hairline distinctions .... " New York v. Belton, 
453 U. S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting LaFave, "Case-By-Case 
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Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robin-
son Dilemma, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 127, 142). This Court repeat-
edly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, po-
lice and citizens by an ad hoc, ·case-by-case definition of 
Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in complex fac-
tual circumstances. See Belton, supra, at 458-460; Robbins 
v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 430 (1981) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 213-214 (1979); 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 235 (1973). The 
ad hoc approach not only makes it difficult for the policeman 
to discern the scope of his authority, Belton, 453 U. S., at 
460; it also creates a danger that constitutional rights will be 
arbitrarily and inequitably enforced. Cf. Smith v. Goguen, 
415 u. s. 566, 572-573 (1974). 
III 
In any event, while the factors that petitioner Oliver and 
respondent Thornton urge the courts to consider are relevant 
to Fourth Amendment analysis in some contexts, we do not 
agree that these factors can be decisive on the question 
whether the search of an open field is reasonable. Initially, 
we reject the suggestion that steps taken to protect privacy 
establish that expectations of privacy in an open field are le-
gitimate. It is true, of course, that petitioner Oliver andre-
spondent Thornton, in order to conceal their criminal activi-
ties, planted the marijuana upon secluded land and erected 
fences and no trespassing signs around the property. And it 
may be that because of such precautions, few members of the 
public stumbled upon the marijuana crops seized by the po-
lice. Neither of these suppositions demonstrates, however, 
that the expectation of privacy was legitimate in the sense re-
quired by the Fourth Amendment. The test of legitimacy is 
not whether the individual choses to conceal the activity 
whose privacy he asserts. 10 Rather, the correct inquiry is 
1° Certainly the Framers did not intend that the Fourth Amendment 
should shelter criminal activity wherever persons with criminal intent 
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whether a warrantless search infringes upon the societal val-
ues protected by the Fourth Amendment. As we have ex-
plained, we find no basis for concluding that a police inspec-
tion of "open fields" accomplishes such an infringement. 
Nor is search of a field "unreasonable" in the constitutional 
sense because that search is a trespass at common law. The 
existence of a property right is but one element in determin-
ing whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. "'[T]he 
premise that property interests control the right of the Gov-
ernment to search and seize has been discredited."' Katz, 
389 U. S., at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 
304 (1967)). "[E]ven a property interest in premises may 
not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy with respect to particular items located on the premises 
or activity conducted thereon." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U. S., at 144 n. 12. 
The common law may guide consideration of the reason-
ableness of a search by defining areas whose invasion by oth-
ers is wrongful. I d., at 153 (POWELL, J., concurring). 11 The 
law of trespass, however, forbids intrusions upon land that 
the Fourth Amendment would not proscribe. For trespass 
law extends to instances where the exercise of the right to 
exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest. 12 It is par-
choose to erect barriers and post no trespassing signs. 
11 As noted above, the common law conception of the "curtilage" has 
served this function. 
12 The common law of trespass furthers a range of interests that have 
nothing to do with privacy, such as the owner's interest in defeating claims 
of prescription by asserting his own title. See, e. g., O.W. Holmes, The 
Common Law, at 98-100, 244-246 (1881). Criminal laws against trespass 
are prophylactic: they protect against intruders who poach, steal crops or 
vandalize property. In this light, the primary function of fences and no 
trespassing signs traditionally has been to permit application of the state 
laws of criminal trespass, not to assert some general expectation of pri-
vacy. See, e. g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, §402.1.C (1983) (tres-
pass to enter a place "which is posted ... in a manner reasonably likely to 
come to the attention of intruders or which is fenced or otherwise enclosed 
in a manner designed to exclude intruders"); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 511.070 
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ticularly implausible to insist that any trespass upon an open 
field is an unreasonable search when the reasonableness of 
aerial surveillance, which accomplishes as great an intrusion 
upon a landowner's privacy, is conceded. See note 9, supra. 
Thus, in the case of open fields, the general rights of property 
protected by the common law of trespass yield to society's in-
terest in effective law enforcement. 
IV 
The disposition of the two cases before us follows readily 
from basic principles. Oliver v. United States is affirmed; 
Maine v. Thornton is reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
(1975) (trespass to enter "upon premises as to which notice against trespass 
is given by fencing or other enclosure"). 
Modern commentators have rationalized the broad common law protec-
tions by noting that anyone who wishes to use the property is free to bar-
gain for the right to do so with the property owner. R, Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Law 10-13, 21 (1973). From this perspective, any use of prop-
erty unlicensed by the owner is presumptively unjustified. This economic 
rationale of the common law of trespass confirms that the common law will 
confer protections from intrusion far broader than those required by 
Fourth Amendment interests. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The "open fields" doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in 
Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924), permits police 
officers to enter and search a field without a warrant. We 
granted certiorari in these cases to clarify confusion that has 
arisen as to the continued vitality of the doctrine. 
I 
No. 82-15. Acting on reports that marijuana was being 
raised on the farm of petitioner Oliver, two narcotics agents 
of the Kentucky State Police went to the farm to investi-
gate. 1 Arriving at the farm, they drove past petitioner's 
house to a locked gate with a "No Trespassing" sign. A foot-
path led around one side of the gate. The agents walked 
' It is conceded that the police did not have a warrant authorizing the 
search, that there was no probable cause for the search and that no excep-
tion to the warrant requirement is applicable. 
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around the gate and along the road for several hundred 
yards, passing a barn and a parked camper. At that point, 
someone standing in front of'the camper shouted, "No hunt-
ing is allowed, come back here." The officers shouted back 
that they were Kentucky State Police officers, but found no 
one when they returned to the camper. The officers re-
sumed their investigation of the farm and found a field of 
marijuana over a mile from petitioner's home. 
Petitioner was arrested and indicted for "manufactur[ing]" 
a "controlled substance." 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). After a 
pretrial hearing, the District Court suppressed evidence of 
the discovery of the marijuana fields. Applying Katz v. 
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967), the court found that 
petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the fields would 
remain private because petitioner "had done all that could be 
expected of him to assert his privacy in the area of farm that 
was searched." He had posted no trespassing signs at regu-
lar intervals and had locked the gate at the entrance to the 
center of the farm. Pet. App., at 23-24. Further, the court 
noted that the fields themselves are highly secluded: they are 
bounded on all sides by woods, fences and embankments and 
cannot be seen from any point of public access. The court 
concluded that this was not an "open" field that invited casual 
intrusion. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed the district court. 686 F. 2d 356 (1982). 2 The 
court concluded that Katz, upon which the District Court re-
lied, had not impaired the vitality of the open fields doctrine 
of Hester. Rather, the open fields doctrine was entirely 
compatible with Katz's emphasis on privacy. The court rea-
soned that the "human relations that create the need for pri-
vacy do not ordinarily take place" in open fields, and that the 
property owner's common law right to exclude trespassers is 
insufficiently linked to privacy to warrant the Fourth 
2 A panel of the Sixth Circuit had affirmed the suppression order. 657 F. 
2d 85 (1981). 
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Amendment's protection. Id., at 360.3 We granted certio-
rari. -U.S.- (1983). 
No. 82-1273. After receiving an anonymous tip that mari-
juana was being grown in the woods behind respondent 
Thornton's residence, two police officers entered the woods 
by a path between this residence and a neighboring house. 
They followed a footpath through the woods until they 
reached two marijuana patches fenced with chicken wire. 
Later, the officers determined that the patches were on the 
property of respondent, obtained a warrant to search the 
property and seized the marijuana. On the basis of this evi-
dence, respondent was arrested and indicted. 
The trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress 
the fruits of the second search. The warrant for this search 
was premised on information that the police had obtained 
during their previous warrantless search, that the court 
found to be unreasonable. 4 "No Trespassing" signs and the 
secluded location of the marijuana patches evinced a reason-
able expectation of privacy. Therefore, the court held, the 
"open fields" doctrine did not apply. 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 453 A. 2d 
489 (1982). It agreed with the trial court that the correct 
question was whether the search "is a violation of privacy on 
which the individual justifiably relied," id., at 493, and that 
the search violated respondent's privacy. The court also 
agreed that the "open fields" doctrine did not justify the 
search. That doctrine applies, according to the court, only 
3 The four dissenting judges contended that the open fields doctrine did 
not apply where, as in this case, "reasonable efforts have been made to ex-
clude the public." 686 F. 2d, at 372. To that extent, the dissent consid-
ered that Katz v. United States, supra, implicitly had overruled previous 
holdings of this Court. The dissent then concluded that petitioner had es-
tablished a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the Katz standard. 
Judge Lively also wrote separately to argue that the open fields doctrine 
applied only to lands that could be viewed by the public. 
' The court also discredited other information, supplied by a confidential 
informant, upon which the police had based their warrant application. 
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when officers are lawfully present on property and observe 
"open and patent" activity .. ld., at 495. In this case, the 
officers had trespassed upon defendant's property, and the 
respondent had made every effort to conceal his activity. 
We granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1983). 5 
II 
As the courts below recognized, the touchstone of Fourth 
Amendment analysis is the question whether a person has a 
"constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 360 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). The Fourth Amendment does not protect the 
merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only "those 
expectations that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able."' !d., at 361. See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 
735, 740-741 (1979). 
5 Respondent contends that the decision below rests upon adequate and 
independent state law grounds. We do not read that decision, however, 
as excluding the evidence because the search violated the state constitu-
tion. The Maine Supreme Court referred only to the Fourth Amendment 
of the federal Constitution and purported to apply the Katz test; the prior 
state cases that the court cited also construed the federal Constitution. In 
any case, the Maine Supreme Court did not articulate an independent state 
ground with the clarity required by Michigan v. Long, -- U. S. --
(1983). 
Contrary to respondent's assertion, we do not review here the state 
courts' finding as a matter of "fact" that the area searched was not an "open 
field." Rather, the question before us is the appropriate legal standard for 
determining whether search of that area without a warrant was lawful 
under the federal Constitution. 
The conflict between the two cases that we review here is illustrative of 
the confusion the "open fields" doctrine has generated among the state and 
federal courts. Compare, e. g., State v. Byers, 359 So. 2d 84 (La. 1978) 
(refusing to apply open fields doctrine); State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093 
(Fla. 1981) (same), with United States v. Case, 669 F. 2d 46, 50-51 (CA2 
1982); United States v. Freie, 545 F. 2d 1217 (CA9 1976); United States v. 
Brown, 473 F. 2d 952, 954 (CA5 1973); Atwell v. United States, 414 F. 2d 
136, 138 (CA5 1969). 
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A 
No single factor determines whether an individual legiti-
mately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place 
should be free of government intrusion not authorized by 
warrant. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 152-153 
(1978) (POWELL, J., concurring) To discern whether a war-
rantless search is "reasonable," this Court has balanced soci-
ety's interest in effective law enforcement against those pri-
vacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. E. g., 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654 (1979); United States 
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 554-555 (1976). In as-
sessing the degree to which a search infringes upon individ-
ual privacy, the Court has given weight to such factors as the 
intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, e. g. 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1977), the uses 
to which the individual has put a location, e. g., Jones v. 
United States, 362 U. S. 257, 265 (1960), and our societal un-
derstanding that certain areas, such as the home, deserve the 
most scrupulous protection from government invasion, e. g., 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980). 
In this light, the rule of Hester v. United States, supra, is 
best understood as providing that an individual may not le-
gitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of 
doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding 
the home. See also Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western 
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861, 865 (1974). We reaffirm that 
rule today. 
The rule accords well with the legitimate scope of individ-
ual privacy as expressed by the Framers in the language of 
the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment indicates with 
some precision the places and items encompassed by its pro-
tections. As Justice Holmes explained for the Court in his 
characteristically laconic style: "[T]he special protection ac-
corded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'per-
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sons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open 
fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as 
old as the common law." Hester v. United States, 265 U. S., 
at 59. 6 
The understanding of the right to privacy embodied in our 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence confirms this interpreta-
tion of the Amendment's language. The Amendment fosters 
individual autonomy and relationships of trust such as friend-
ship and family by establishing enclaves free from arbitrary 
government interference. For example, the Court since the 
enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed "the over-
riding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been em-
bedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic." 
Payton v. New York, supra, at 601. 7 See also Silverman v. 
United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961); United States v. 
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 293, 313 (1972). 
The "open fields" doctrine is true to this conception of the 
right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 
For open fields do not generally provide the setting for those 
• In this respect, it is suggestive that John Madison's proposed draft of 
what became the Fourth Amendment preserved "[t]he rights of the people 
to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other 
property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures. . .. " See N. 
Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution 100, n. 77 (1937) (emphasis added). Congress's 
revisions of Madison's proposal broadened the scope of the Amendment in 
some respects, id., at 100-103; however, the term "effects" is less inclusive 
than "property" and cannot be said to encompass open fields. 
This Court frequently has relied on the explicit language of the amend-
ment as delineating the scope of its affirmative protections. See, e. g., 
Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 426 (1981) (opinion of Stewart, J.); 
Payton v. New York , 445 U. S., at 589--590; Alderman v. United States, 
394 u. s. 165, 178-180 (1969). 
7 The Fourth Amendment's protection of offices and commercial build-
ings, in which there may be legitimate expectations of privacy, is also 
based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the 
Amendment. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 311 (1978); 
G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 355 (1977) 
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intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter 
from government .interference or surveillance. There is no 
societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, 
such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields. 
Further, as a practical matter these lands usually are accessi-
ble to the public and the police in ways that a home or com-
mercial structure would not be. It is not generally true that 
fences or no trespassing signs effectively bar the public from 
viewing open fields in rural areas. And both petitioner Oli-
ver and respondent Thornton concede that the public and po-
lice lawfully may survey lands from the air. 8 For these rea-
sons, the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not 
an expectation that "society recognizes as reasonable." 9 
The historical underpinnings of the "open fields" doctrine 
also demonstrate that the doctrine is consistent with respect 
for "reasonable expectations of privacy." As Justice 
Holmes, writing for the Court, observed in Hester v. United 
States, 265 U. S., at 57, the common law distinguished "open 
fields" from the "curtilage," the land immediately surround-
ing and associated with the home. See 4 Blackstone, Com-
mentaries *225. The distinction implies that only the curti-
lage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth 
Amendment protections that attach to the home. At com-
8 Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15, 58. See, e. g., United States v. Allen, 675 F. 
2d 1373, 1380-1381 (CA9 1980); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F . Supp. 
1078, 1081 (WD Mich. 1980). In practical terms, petitioner Oliver's and 
respondent Thornton's analysis merely would require law enforcement offi-
cers to use aerial surveillance to gather the information necessary to obtain 
a warrant or to justify warrantless entry onto the property. It is hard to 
see how such a requirement would advance legitimate privacy interests. 
9 The Fourth Amendment provides ample protection to activities in the 
open fields that might implicate an individual's privacy. An individual who 
enters a place defined to be "public" for Fourth Amendment analysis does 
not lose all claims to privacy or personal security. Cf. Arkansas v. Sand-
ers , 442 U. S. 753, 766--767 (1979) (BURGER, C. J., concurring). For ex-
ample, the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable arrest 
or unreasonable seizure of effects upon the person remain fully applicable. 
See, e. g., United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976). 
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mon law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the inti-
mate activity associated with the "sanctity of a man's home 
and the privacies of life." Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 
616, 630 (1886). Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amend-
ment protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the 
curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to the factors 
that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect 
that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain 
private. 10 See, e. g., United States v. van Dyke, 643 F. 2d 
992, 993-994 (CA4 1981); United States v. Williams, 581 
F. 2d 451, 453 (CA5 1978); Care v. United States, 231 F. 2d 
22, 25 (CAIO), cert. denied, 351 U. S. 932 (1956). Con-
versely, the common law implies, as we reaffirm today, that 
no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields. 
We conclude, from the text of the Fourth Amendment and 
from the historical and contemporary understanding of its 
purposes, that an individual has no legitimate expectation 
that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion 
by government officers. 
B 
Petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton contend, to the 
contrary, that the circumstances of a search sometimes may 
indicate that reasonable expectations of privacy were vio-
lated; and that courts therefore should analyze these circum-
stances on a case-by-case basis. We do not agree with these 
contentions. 
The case-by-case approach does not provide a workable ac-
commodation between the needs of law enforcement and the 
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Under this 
approach, police officers would have to guess before every 
search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently 
high, posted a sufficient number of warning signs, or located 
contraband in an area sufficiently secluded to establish a 
10 Neither petitioner Oliver nor respondent Thornton has contended that 
the property searched was within the curtilage, and we have no ocassion 
here to consider the scope of this doctrine. 
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right of privacy. The lawfulness of a search would turn on 
"[a] highly sophisticated set Qf rules, qualified by all sorts of 
ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nu-
ances and hairline distinctions .... " New York v. Belton, 
453 U. S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting LaFave, "Case-By-Case 
Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robin-
son Dilemma, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 127, 142). This Court repeat-
edly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, po-
lice and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of 
Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in complex fac-
tual circumstances. See Belton, supra, at 458-460; Robbins 
v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 430 (1981) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 213-214 (1979); 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 235 (1973). The 
ad hoc approach not only makes it difficult for the policeman 
to discern the scope of his authority, Belton, supra, at 460; it 
also creates a danger that constitutional rights will be arbi-
trarily and inequitably enforced. Cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415 
u. s. 566, 572-573 (1974). 
III 
In any event, while the factors that petitioner Oliver and 
respondent Thornton urge the courts to consider are relevant 
to Fourth Amendment analysis in some contexts, we do not 
agree that these factors can be decisive on the question 
whether the search of an open field is reasonable. Initially, 
we reject the suggestion that steps taken to protect privacy 
establish that expectations of privacy in an open field are le-
gitimate. It is true, of course, that petitioner Oliver and re-
spondent Thornton, in order to conceal their criminal activi-
ties, planted the marijuana upon secluded land and erected 
fences and no trespassing signs around the property. And it 
may be that because of such precautions, few members of the 
public stumbled upon the marijuana crops seized by the po-
lice. Neither of these suppositions demonstrates, however, 
that the expectation of privacy was legitimate in the sense re-
... t;. 
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quired by the Fourth Amendment. The test of legitimacy is 
not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly "pri-
vate" activity. 11 Rather, the correct inquiry is whether a 
warrantless search infringes upon the societal values pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. As we have explained, 
we find no basis for concluding that a police inspection of open 
fields accomplishes such an infringement. 
Nor is search of a field "unreasonable" in the constitutional 
sense because that search is a trespass at common law. The 
existence of a property right is but one element in determin-
ing whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. "'[T]he 
premise that property interests control the right of the Gov-
ernment to search and seize has been discredited."' Katz, 
389 U. S., at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 
304 (1967)). "[E]ven a property interest in premises may 
not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy with respect to particular items located on the premises 
or activity conducted thereon." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U. S., at 144 n. 12. 
The common law may guide consideration of the reason-
ableness of a search by defining areas whose invasion by oth-
ers is wrongful. I d., at 153 (POWELL, J., concurring). 12 The 
law of trespass, however, forbids intrusions upon land that 
the Fourth Amendment would not proscribe. For trespass 
law extends to instances where the exercise of the right to 
exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest. 13 It is par-
11 Certainly the Framers did not intend that the Fourth Amendment 
should shelter criminal activity wherever persons with criminal intent 
choose to erect barriers and post no trespassing signs. 
12 As noted above, the common law conception of the "curtilage" has 
served this function. 
13 The common law of trespass furthers a range of interests that have 
nothing to do with privacy, such as the owner's interest in defeating claims 
of prescription by asserting his own title. See, e. g., 0 . W. Holmes, The 
Common Law 98-100, 244-246 (1881). Criminal laws against trespass are 
prophylactic: they protect against intruders who poach, steal crops or van-
dalize property. The primary function of fences and no trespassing signs 
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ticularly implausible to insist that any trespass upon an open 
field is an unreasonable search when the reasonableness of 
aerial surveillance, which acc'omplishes as great an intrusion 
upon a landowner's privacy, is conceded. See note 9, supra. 
Thus, in the case of open fields, the general rights of property 
protected by the common law of trespass yield to society's in-
terest in effective law enforcement. 
IV 
The disposition of the two cases before us follows readily 
from basic principles. Oliver v. United States is affirmed; 
Maine v. Thornton is reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
traditionally has been to permit application of the state laws of criminal 
trespass, not to assert some general expectation of privacy. See, e. g., 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, §402.1.C (1983) (trespass to enter a place 
"which is posted ... in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention 
of intruders or which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed 
to exclude intruders"); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 511.070 (1975) (trespass to enter 
. "upon premises as to which notice against trespass is given by fencing or 
other enclosure"). 
Modern commentators have rationalized the broad common law protec-
tions by noting that anyone who wishes to use the property is free to bar-
gain for the right to do so with the property owner. R. Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Law 10-13, 21 (1973). From this perspective, any use of prop-
erty is presumptively unjustified if that use is unlicensed by the owner. 
This economic rationale of the common law of trespass confirms that the 
common law will confer protections from intrusion far broader than those 
required by Fourth Amendment interests. 
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JuSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The "open fields" doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in 
Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924), permits police 
officers to enter and search a field without a warrant. We 
granted certiorari in these cases to clarify confusion that has 
arisen as to the continued vitality of the doctrine. 
I 
No. 82-15. Acting on reports that marijuana was being 
raised on the farm of petitioner Oliver, two narcotics agents 
of the Kentucky State Police went to the farm to investi-
gate. 1 Arriving at the farm, they drove past petitioner's 
house to a locked gate with a "No Trespassing" sign. A foot-
path led around one side of the gate. The agents walked 
1 It is conceded that the police did not have a warrant authorizing the 
search, that there was no probable cause for the search and that no excep-
tion to the warrant requirement is applicable. 
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around the gate and along the road for several hundred 
yards, passing a barn and a parked camper. At that point, 
someone standing in front of' the camper shouted, "No hunt-
ing is allowed, come back here." The officers shouted back 
that they were Kentucky State Police officers, but found no 
one when they returned to the camper. The officers re-
sumed their investigation of the farm and found a field of 
marijuana over a mile from petitioner's home. 
Petitioner was arrested and indicted for "manufactur[ing]" 
a "controlled substance." 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). After a 
pretrial hearing, the District Court suppressed evidence of 
the discovery of the marijuana fields. Applying Katz v. 
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967), the court found that 
petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the fields would 
remain private because petitioner "had done all that could be 
expected of him to assert his privacy in the area of farm that 
was searched." He had posted no trespassing signs at regu-
lar intervals and had locked the gate at the entrance to the 
center of the farm. Pet. App., at 23-24. Further, the court 
noted that the fields themselves are highly secluded: they are 
bounded on all sides by woods, fences and embankments and 
cannot be seen from any point of public access. The court 
concluded that this was not an "open" field that invited casual 
intrusion. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed the district court. 686 F. 2d 356 (1982). 2 The 
court concluded that Katz, upon which the District Court re-
lied, had not impaired the vitality of the open fields doctrine 
of Hester. Rather, the open fields doctrine was entirely 
compatible with Katz's emphasis on privacy. The court rea-
soned that the "human relations that create the need for pri-
vacy do not ordinarily take place" in open fields, and that the 
property owner's common law right to exclude trespassers is 
insufficiently linked to privacy to warrant the Fourth 
2 A panel of the Sixth Circuit had affirmed the suppression order. 657 F. 
2d 85 (1981). 
•.. 
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Amendment's protection. Id., at 360. 3 We granted certio-
rari. --U.S.-- (1983). 
No. 82-1273. After receiving an anonymous tip that mari-
juana was being grown in the woods behind respondent 
Thornton's residence, two police officers entered the woods 
by a path between this residence and a neighboring house. 
They followed a footpath through the woods until they 
reached two marijuana patches fenced with chicken wire. 
Later, the officers determined that the patches were on the 
property of respondent, obtained a warrant to search the 
property and seized the marijuana. On the basis of this evi-
dence, respondent was arrested and indicted. 
The trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress 
the fruits of the second search. The warrant for this search 
was premised on information that the police had obtained 
during their previous warrantless search, that the court 
found to be unreasonable. 4 "No Trespassing" signs and the 
secluded location of the marijuana patches evinced a reason-
able expectation of privacy. Therefore, the court held, the 
"open fields" doctrine did not apply. 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 453 A. 2d 
489 (1982). It agreed with the trial court that the correct 
question was whether the search "is a violation of privacy on 
which the individual justifiably relied," id., at 493, and that 
the search violated respondent's privacy. The court also 
agreed that the "open fields" doctrine did not justify the 
search. That doctrine applies, according to the court, only 
3 The four dissenting judges contended that the open fields doctrine did 
not apply where, as in this case, "reasonable efforts have been made to ex-
clude the public." 686 F. 2d, at 372. To that extent, the dissent consid-
ered that Katz v. United States , supra, implicitly had overruled previous 
holdings of this Court. The dissent then concluded that petitioner had es-
tablished a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the Katz standard. 
Judge Lively also wrote separately to argue that the open fields doctrine 
applied only to lands that could be viewed by the public. 
'The court also discredited other information, supplied by a confidential 
informant, upon which the police had based their warrant application . 
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when officers are lawfully present on property and observe 
"open and patent" activity . . !d., at 495. In this case, the 
officers had trespassed upon defendant's property, and the 
respondent had made every effort to conceal his activity. 
We granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1983). 5 
II 
As the courts below recognized, the touchstone of Fourth 
Amendment analysis is the question whether a person has a 
"constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 360 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). The Fourth Amendment does not protect the 
merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only "those 
expectations that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able."' !d., at 361. See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 
735, 740-741 (1979). 
5 Respondent contends that the decision below rests upon adequate and 
independent state law grounds. We do not read that decision, however, 
as excluding the evidence because the search violated the state constitu-
tion. The Maine Supreme Court referred only to the Fourth Amendment 
of the federal Constitution and purported to apply the Katz test; the prior 
state cases that the court cited also construed the federal Constitution. In 
any case, the Maine Supreme Court did not articulate an independent state 
ground with the clarity required by Michigan v. Long, -- U. S. --
(1983). 
Contrary to respondent's assertion, we do not review here the state 
courts' finding as a matter of "fact" that the area searched was not an "open 
field." Rather, the question before us is the appropriate legal standard for 
determining whether search of that area without a warrant was lawful 
under the federal Constitution. 
The conflict between the two cases that we review here is illustrative of 
the confusion the "open fields" doctrine has generated among the state and 
federal courts. Compare, e. g., State v. Byers, 359 So. 2d 84 (La. 1978) 
(refusing to apply open fields doctrine); State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093 
(Fla. 1981) (same), with United States v. Case , 669 F. 2d 46, 50-51 (CA2 
1982); United States v. Freie, 545 F. 2d 1217 (CA9 1976); United States v. 
Brown, 473 F. 2d 952, 954 (CA5 1973); Atwell v. United States, 414 F. 2d 
136, 138 (CA5 1969). 
·•··· .. 
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A 
No single factor determines whether an individual legiti-
mately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place 
should be free of government intrusion not authorized by 
warrant. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 152-153 
(1978) (POWELL, J., concurring) To discern whether a war-
rantless search is "reasonable," this Court has balanced soci-
ety's interest in effective law enforcement against those pri-
vacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. E. g., 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654 (1979); United States 
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 554-555 (1976). In as-
sessing the degree to which a search infringes upon individ-
ual privacy, the Court has given weight to such factors as the 
intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, e. g. 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 7--8 (1977), the uses 
to which the individual has put a location, e. g., Jones v. 
United States, 362 U. S. 257, 265 (1960), and our societal un-
derstanding that certain areas, such as the home, deserve the 
most scrupulous protection from government invasion, e. g., 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980). 
In this light, the rule of Hester v. United States, supra, is 
best understood as providing that an individual may not le-
gitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of 
doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding 
the home. See also Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western 
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861, 865 (1974). We reaffirm that 
rule today. 
The rule accords well with the legitimate scope of individ-
ual privacy as expressed by the Framers in the language of 
the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment indicates with 
some precision the places and items encompassed by its pro-
tections. As Justice Holmes explained for the Court in his 
characteristically laconic style: "[T]he special protection ac-
corded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'per-
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sons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open 
fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as 
old as the common law." Hester v. United States, 265 U. S., 
at 59. 6 
The understanding of the right to privacy embodied in our 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence confirms this interpreta-
tion of the Amendment's language. The Amendment fosters 
individual autonomy and relationships of trust such as friend-
ship and family by establishing enclaves free from arbitrary 
government interference. For example, the Court since the 
enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed "the over-
riding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been em-
bedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic." 
Payton v. New York, supra, at 601. 7 See also Silverman v. 
United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961); United States v. 
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 293, 313 (1972). 
The "open fields" doctrine is true to this conception of the 
right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 
For open fields do not generally provide the setting for those 
6 In this respect, it is suggestive that Madison's proposed draft of 
what became the Fourth Amendment preserved "[t]he rights of the people 
to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other 
property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures . . .. " See N. 
Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution 100, n. 77 (1937) (emphasis added). Congress's 
revisions of Madison's proposal broadened the scope of the Amendment in 
some respects, id., at 100-103; however, the term "effects" is less inclusive 
than "property" and cannot be said to encompass open fields. 
This Court frequently has relied on the explicit language of the amend-
ment as delineating the scope of its affirmative protections. See, e. g., 
Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 426 (1981) (opinion of Stewart, J.); 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 589-590; Alderman v. United States, 
394 u. s. 165, 178-180 (1969). 
7 The Fourth Amendment's protection of offices and commercial build-
ings, in which there may be legitimate expectations of privacy, is also 
based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the 
Amendment. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 311 (1978); 
G. M . Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 355 (1977) 
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intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter 
from government interference or surveillance. There is no 
societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, 
such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields. 
Further, as a practical matter these lands usually are accessi-
ble to the public and the police in ways that a home or com-
mercial structure would not be. It is not generally true that 
fences or no trespassing signs effectively bar the public from 
viewing open fields in rural areas. And both petitioner Oli-
ver and respondent Thornton concede that the public and po-
lice lawfully may survey lands from the air. 8 For these rea-
sons, the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not 
an expectation that "society recognizes as reasonable." 9 
The historical underpinnings of the "open fields" doctrine 
also demonstrate that the doctrine is consistent with respect 
for "reasonable expectations of privacy." As Justice 
Holmes, writing for the Court, observed in Hester v. United 
States, 265 U. 8., at 57, the common law distinguished "open 
fields" from the "curtilage," the land immediately surround-
ing and associated with the home. See 4 Blackstone, Com-
mentaries *225. The distinction implies that only the curti-
lage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth 
Amendment protections that attach to the home. At com-
8 Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15, 58. See, e. g., United States v. Allen, 675 F. 
2d 1373, 1380-1381 (CA9 1980); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F . Supp. 
1078, 1081 (WD Mich. 1980). In practical terms, petitioner Oliver's and 
respondent Thornton's analysis merely would require law enforcement offi-
cers to use aerial surveillance to gather the information necessary to obtain 
a warrant or to justify warrantless entry onto the property. It is hard to 
see how such a requirement would advance legitimate privacy interests. 
9 The Fourth Amendment provides ample protection to activities in the 
open fields that might implicate an individual's privacy. An individual who 
enters a place defined to be "public" for Fourth Amendment analysis does 
not lose all claims to privacy or personal security. Cf. Arkansas v. Sand-
ers, 442 U. S. 753, 766-767 (1979) (BURGER, C. J ., concurring). For ex-
ample, the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable arrest 
or unreasonable seizure of effects upon the person remain fully applicable. 
See, e. g., United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976). 
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mon law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the inti-
mate activity associated with the "sanctity of a man's home 
and the privacies of life." Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 
616, 630 (1886). Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amend-
ment protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the 
curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to the factors 
that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect 
that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain 
private. 10 See, e. g., United States v. van Dyke, 643 F. 2d 
992, 993--994 (CA4 1981); United States v. Williams, 581 
F. 2d 451, 453 (CA5 1978); Care v. United States, 231 F. 2d 
22, 25 (CAlO), cert. denied, 351 U. S. 932 (1956). Con-
versely, the common law implies, as we reaffirm today, that 
no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields. 
We conclude, from the text of the Fourth Amendment and 
from the historical and contemporary understanding of its 
purposes, that an individual has no legitimate expectation 
that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion 
by government officers. 
B 
Petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton contend, to the 
contrary, that the circumstances of a search sometimes may 
indicate that reasonable expectations of privacy were vio-
lated; and that courts therefore should analyze these circum-
stances on a case-by-case basis. We do not agree with these 
contentions. 
The case-by-case approach does not provide a workable ac-
commodation between the needs of law enforcement and the 
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Under this 
approach, police officers would have to guess before every 
search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently 
high, posted a sufficient number of warning signs, or located 
contraband i.n an area sufficiently secluded to establish a 
10 Neither petitioner Oliver nor respondent Thornton has contended that 
the property searched was within the curtilage, and we have no ocassion 
here to consider the scope of this doctrine. 
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right of privacy. The lawfulness of a search would turn on 
"[a] highly sophisticated set Qf rules, qualified by all sorts of 
ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nu-
ances and hairline distinctions .... " New York v. Belton, 
453 U. S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting LaFave, "Case-By-Case 
Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robin-
son Dilemma, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 127, 142). This Court repeat-
edly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, po-
lice and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of 
Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in complex fac-
tual circumstances. See Belton, supra, at 458-460; Robbins 
v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 430 (1981) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 213--214 (1979); 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 235 (1973). The 
ad hoc approach not only makes it difficult for the policeman 
to discern the scope of his authority, Belton, supra, at 460; it 
also creates a danger that constitutional rights will be arbi-
trarily and inequitably enforced. Cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415 
u. s. 566, 572-573 (1974). 
III 
In any event, while the factors that petitioner Oliver and 
respondent Thornton urge the courts to consider are relevant 
to Fourth Amendment analysis in some contexts, we do not 
agree that these factors can be decisive on the question 
whether the search of an open field is reasonable~..; Initially, 
we reject the suggestion that steps taken to protect privacy 
establish that expectations of privacy in an open field are le-
gitimate. It is true, of course, that petitioner Oliver and re-
spondent Thornton, in order to conceal their criminal activi-
ties, planted the marijuana upon secluded land and erected 
fences and no trespassing signs around the property. And it 
may be that because of such precautions, few members of the 
public stumbled upon the marijuana crops seized by the po-
lice. Neither of these suppositions demonstrates, however, 
that the expectation of privacy was legitimate in the sense re-
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quired by the Fourth Amendment. The test of legitimacy is 
not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly "pri-
vate" activity. 11 Rather, the correct inquiry is whether a 
warrantless search infringes upon the societal values pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. As we have explained, 
we find no basis for concluding that a police inspection of open 
fields accomplishes such an infringement. 
Nor is search of a field "unreasonable" in the constitutional 
sense because that search is a trespass at common law. The 
existence of a property right is but one element in determin-
ing whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. "'[T]he 
premise that property interests control the right of the Gov-
ernment to search and seize has been discredited."' Katz, 
389 U. 8., at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 
304 (1967)). "[E]ven a property interest in premises may 
not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy with respect to particular items located on the premises 
or activity conducted thereon." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U. 8., at 144 n. 12. 
The common law may guide consideration of the reason-
ableness of a search by defining areas whose invasion by oth-
ers is wrongful. I d., at 153 (POWELL, J., concurring). 12 The 
law of trespass, however, forbids intrusions upon land that 
the Fourth Amendment would not proscribe. For trespass 
law extends to instances where the exercise of the right to 
exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest. 13 It is par-
11 Certainly the Framers did not intend that the Fourth A~endment 
should shelter criminal activity wherever persons with criminal intent 
choose to erect barriers and post no trespassing signs. 
12 As noted above, the common law conception of the "curtilage" has 
served this function. 
13 The common law of trespass furthers a range of interests that have 
nothing to do with privacy, such as the owner's interest in defeating claims 
of prescription by asserting his own title. See, e. g., 0. W. Holmes, The 
Common Law 98-100, 244-246 (1881). Criminal laws against trespass are 
prophylactic: they protect against intruders who poach, steal crops or van-
dalize property. The primary function of fences and no trespassing signs 
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ticularly implausible to insist that any trespass upon an open 
field is an unreasonable search when the reasonableness of 
aerial surveillance, which acc'omplishes as great an intrusion 
upon a landowner's privacy, is conceded. See note 9, supra. 
Thus, in the case of open fields, the general rights of property 
protected by the common law of trespass yield to society's in-
terest in effective law enforcement. 
IV 
The disposition of the two cases before us follows readily 
from basic principles. Oliver v. United States is affirmed; 
Maine v. Thornton is reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
traditionally has been to permit application of the state laws of criminal 
trespass, not to assert some general expectation of privacy. See, e. g., 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, §402.1.C (1983) (trespass to enter a place 
"which is posted . . . in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention 
of intruders or which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed 
to exclude intruders"); Ky. Rev. · Stat. § 511.070 (1975) (trespass to enter 
"upon premises as to which notice against trespass is given by fencing or 
other enclosure"). 
Modem commentators have rationalized the broad common law protec-
tions by noting that anyone who wishes to use the property is free to bar-
gain for the right to do so with the property owner. R. Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Law 10-13, 21 (1973). From this perspective, any use of prop-
erty is presumptively unjustified if that use is unlicensed by the owner. 
This economic rationale of the common law of trespass confirms that the 
common law will confer protections from intrusion far broader than those 
required by Fourth Amendment interests. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the qourt. 
The "open fields" doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in 
Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924), permits police 
officers to enter and search a field without a warrant. We 
granted certiorari in these cases to clarify confusion that has 
arisen as to the continued vitality of the doctrine. 
I 
No. 82-15. Acting on reports that marijuana was being 
raised on the farm of petitioner Oliver, two narcotics agents 
of the Kentucky State Police went to the farm to investi-
gate. 1 Arriving at the farm, they drove past petitioner's 
house to a locked gate with a "No Trespassing" sign. A foot-
path led around one side of the gate. The agents walked 
' It is conceded that the police did not have a warrant authorizing the 
search, that there was no probable cause for the search and that no excep-
tion to the warrant requirement is applicable. 
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around the gate and along the road for several hundred 
yards, passing a barn and a parked camper. At that point, 
someone standing in front of'the camper shouted, "No hunt-
ing is allowed, come back here." The officers shouted back 
that they were Kentucky State Police officers, but found no 
one when they returned to the camper. The officers re-
sumed their investigation of the farm and found a field of 
marijuana over a mile from petitioner's home. 
Petitioner was arrested and indicted for "manufactur[ing]" 
a "controlled substance." 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). After a 
pretrial hearing, the District Court suppressed evidence of 
the discovery of the marijuana fields. Applying Katz v. 
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967), the court found that 
petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the fields would 
remain private because petitioner "had done all that could be 
expected of him to assert his privacy in the area of farm that 
was searched." He had posted no trespassing signs at regu-
lar intervals and had locked the gate at the entrance to the L.j--
center of the farm. Pet. App., at 23-24. Further, tali! eeal"t 7 
noted that the fields themselves are highly secluded: they are · 
bounded on all sides by woods, fences and embankments and 
cannot be seen from any point of public access. The court 
concluded that this was not an "open" field that invited casual 
intrusion. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed the district court. 686 F. 2d 356 (1982). 2 The 
court concluded that Katz, upon which the District Court re-
lied, had not impaired the vitality of the open fields doctrine 
of Hester. Rather, the open fields doctrine was entirely 
compatible with Katz's emphasis on privacy. The court rea-
soned that the "human relations that create the need for pri-
vacy do not ordinarily take place" in open fields, and that the 
property owner's common law right to exclude trespassers is 
insufficiently linked to privacy to warrant the Fourth 
' A panel of the Sixth Circuit had affirmed the suppression order. 657 F. 
2d 85 (1981). 
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Amendment's protection. Id., at 360.3 We granted certio-
rari. -U.S.- (1983).. 
No. 82-1273. After receiving an anonymous tip that mari-
juana was being grown in the woods behind respondent 
Thornton's residence, two police officers entered the woods 
by a path between this residence and a neighboring house. 
They followed a footpath through the woods until they 
reached two marijuana patches fenced with chicken wire. 
Later, the officers determined that the patches were on the 
property of respondent, obtained a warrant to search the 
property and seized the marijuana. On the basis of this evi-
dence, respondent was arrested and indicted. 
The trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress 
the fruits of the second search. The warrant for this search 
was premised on information that the police had obtained 
during their previous warrantless search, that the court 
found to be unreasonable. 4 "No Trespassing" signs and the 
secluded location of the marijuana patches evinced a reason-
able expectation of privacy. Therefore, the court held, the 
"open fields" doctrine did not apply. 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 453 A. 2d 
489 (1982). It agreed with the trial court that the correct 
question was whether the search "is a violation of privacy on 
which the individual justifiably relied," id., at 493, and that 
the search violated respondent's privacy. The court also 
· agreed that the "open fields" doctrine did not justify the 
search. That doctrine applies, according to the court, only 
3 The four dissenting judges contended that the open fields doctrine did 
not apply where, as in this case, "reasonable efforts have been made to ex-
clude the public." 686 F. 2d, at 372. To that extent, the dissent consid-
ered that Katz v. United States, supra, implicitly had overruled previous 
holdings of this Court. The dissent then concluded that petitioner had es-
tablished a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the Katz standard. 
Judge Lively also wrote separately to argue that the open fields doctrine 
applied only to lands that could be viewed by the public. 
' The court also discredited other information, supplied by a confidential 
informant, upon which the police had based their warrant application. 
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when officers are lawfully present on property and observe 
"open and patent" activity . . !d., at 495. In this case, the 
officers had trespassed upon defendant's property, and the 
respondent had made every effort to conceal his activity. 
We granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1983). 5 
II 
As the courts below recognized, the touchstone of Fourth 
Amendment analysis is the question whether a person has a 
"constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 360 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). The Fourth Amendment does not protect the 
merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only "those 
expectations that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able."' !d., at 361. See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 
735, 740-741 (1979). 
5 Respondent contends that the decision below rests upon adequate and 
independent state law grounds. We do not read that decision, however, 
as excluding the evidence because the search violated the state constitu-
tion. The Maine Supreme Court referred only to the Fourth Amendment 
of the federal Constitution and purported to apply the Katz test; the prior 
state cases that the court cited also construed the federal Constitution. In 
any case, the Maine Supreme Court did not articulate an independent state 
ground with the clarity required by Michigan v. Long, -- U. S. --
(1983). 
Contrary to respondent's assertion, we do not review here the state 
courts' finding as a matter of "fact" that the area searched was not an "open 
field." Rather, the question before us is the appropriate legal standard for 
determining whether search of that area without a warrant was lawful 
under the federal Constitution. 
The conflict between the two cases that we review here is illustrative of 
the confusion the "open fields" doctrine has generated among the state and 
federal courts. Compare, e. g., State v. Byers, 359 So. 2d 84 (La. 1978) 
(refusing to apply open fields doctrine); State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093 
(Fla. 1981) (same), with United States v. Case, 669 F. 2d 46, 50-51 (CA2 
1982); United States v. Freie, 545 F. 2d 1217 (CA9 1976); United States v. 
Broum, 473 F. 2d 952, 954 (CA5 1973); Atwell v. United States, 414 F . 2d 
136, 138 (CA5 1969). 
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A 
No single factor determines whether an individual legiti-
mately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place 
should be free of government intrusion not authorized by 
warrant. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 152-153 
(1978) (POWELL, J., concurring) To discern whether a war-
rantless search is "reasonable," this Court has balanced soci-
ety's interest in effective law enforcement against those pri-
vacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. E. g., 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654 (1979); United States 
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 554-555 (1976). In as-
sessing the degree to which a search infringes upon individ-
ual privacy, the Court has given weight to such factors as the 
intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, e. g. 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1977), the uses 
to which the individual has put a location, e. g., Jones v. 
United States, 362 U. S. 257, 265 (1960), and our societal un-
derstanding that certain areas, such as the home, deserve the 
most scrupulous protection from government invasion, e. g., 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980). 
In this light, the rule of Hester v. United States, supra, is 
best understood as providing that an individual may not le-
gitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of 
doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding 
the home. See also Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western 
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861, 865 (1974). We reaffirm that 
rule today. 
The rule accords well with the legitimate scope of individ-
ual privacy as expressed by the Framers in the language of 
the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment indicates with 
some precision the places and items encompassed by its pro-
tections. As Justice Holmes explained for the Court in his 
characteristically laconic style: "[T]he special protection ac-
corded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'per-
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sons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open 
fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as 
old as the common law." Hester v. United States, 265 U. S., 
at 59. 6 
The understanding of the right to privacy embodied in our 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence confirms this interpreta-
tion of the Amendment's language. The Amendment fosters 
individual autonomy and relationships of trust such as friend-
ship and family by establishing enclaves free from arbitrary 
government interference. For example, the Court since the 
enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed "the over-
riding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been em-
bedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic." 
Payton v. New York, supra, at 601. 7 See also Silverman v. 
United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961); United States v. 
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 293, 313 (1972). 
The "open fields" doctrine is true to this conception of the 
right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 
For open fields do not generally provide the setting for those 
~-----u ()~ 
6 In this respect, it is suggestive that adison's proposed draft of !/ 
what became the Fourth Amendment preserved "[t]he rights of the people 
to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other 
property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures .... " See N. 
Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution 100, n. 77 (1937) (emphasis added). Congress's 
revisions of Madison's proposal broadened the scope of the Amendment in 
some respects, id. , at 100-103; however, the term "effects" is less inclusive 
than "property" and cannot be said to encompass open fields. 
This Court frequently has relied on the explicit language of the amend-
ment as delineating the scope of its affirmative protections. See, e. g., 
Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 426 (1981) (opinion of Stewart, J.); 
Payton v. New York , 445 U. S., at 589--590; Alderman v. United States, 
394 u. s. 165, 17~180 (1969). 
7 The Fourth Amendment's protection of offices and commercial build-
ings, in which there may be legitimate expectations of privacy, is also 
based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the 
Amendment. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc ., 436 U. S. 307, 311 (1978); 
G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 355 (1977) 
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intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter 
from government interference or surveillance. There is no 
societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, 
such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields. 
Further, as a practical matter these lands usually are accessi-
ble to the public and the police in ways that a home or com-
mercial structure would not be. It is not generally true that 
fences or no trespassing signs effectively bar the public from 
viewing open fields in rural areas. And both petitioner Oli-
ver and respondent Thornton concede that the public and po-
lice lawfully may survey lands from the air. 8 For these rea-
sons, the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not 
an expectation that "society recognizes as reasonable." 9 
The historical underpinnings of the "open fields" doctrine 
also demonstrate that the doctrine is consistent with respect 
for "reasonable expectations of privacy." As Justice 
Holmes, writing for the Court, observed in Hester v. United 
States, 265 U. 8., at 57, the common law distinguished "open 
fields" from the "curtilage," the land immediately surround-
ing and associated with the home. See 4 Blackstone, Com-
mentaries *225. The distinction implies that only the curti-
lage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth 
Amendment protections that attach to the home. At com-
8 Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15, 58. See, e. g., United States v. Allen, 675 F. 
2d 1373, 1380-1381 (CA9 1980); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 
1078, 1081 (WD Mich. 1980). In practical terms, petitioner Oliver's and 
respondent Thornton's analysis merely would require law enforcement offi-
cers to use aerial surveillance to gather the information necessary to obtain 
a warrant or to justify warrantless entry onto the property. It is hard to 
see how such a requirement would advance legitimate privacy interests. 
9 The Fourth Amendment provides ample protection to activities in the 
open fields that might implicate an individual's privacy. An individual who 
enters a place defined to be "public" for Fourth Amendment analysis does 
not lose all claims to privacy or personal security. Cf. Arkansas v. Sand-
ers, 442 U. S. 753, 766-767 (1979) (BURGER, C. J., concurring). For ex-
ample, the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable arrest 
or unreasonable seizure of effects upon the person remain fully applicable. 
See, e. g., United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976). 
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mon law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the inti-
mate activity associated with the "sanctity of a man's home 
and the privacies of life." Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 
616, 630 (1886). Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amend-
ment protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the 
curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to the factors 
that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect 
that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain 
private. 10 See, e. g., United States v. van Dyke, 643 F. 2d 
992, 993-994 (CA4 1981); United States v. Williams, 581 
F. 2d 451, 453 (CA5 1978); Care v. United States, 231 F. 2d 
22, 25 (CAlO), cert. denied, 351 U. S. 932 (1956). Con-
versely, the common law implies, as we reaffirm today, that 
no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields. 
We conclude, from the text of the Fourth Amendment and 
from the historical and contemporary understanding of its 
purposes, that an individual has no legitimate expectation 
that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion 
by government officers. 
B 
Petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton contend, to the 
contrary, that the circumstances of a search sometimes may 
indicate that reasonable expectations of privacy were vio-
lated; and that courts therefore should analyze these circum-
stances on a case-by-case basis. We do not agree with these 
contentions. 
The case-by-case approach does not provide a workable ac-
commodation between the needs of law enforcement and the 
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Under this 
approach, police officers would have to guess before every 
search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently 
high, posted a sufficient number of warning signs, or located 
contraband in an area sufficiently secluded to establish a 
10 Neither petitioner Oliver nor respondent Thornton has contended that 
the property searched was within the curtilage, and we have no ocassion 
here to consider the scope of this doctrine. 
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right of privacy. The lawfulness of a search would turn on 
"[a] highly sophisticated set Qf rules, qualified by all sorts of 
ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nu-
ances and hairline distinctions .... " New York v. Belton, 
453 U. S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting LaFave, "Case-By-Case 
Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robin-
son Dilemma, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 127, 142). This Court repeat-
edly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, po-
lice and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of 
Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in complex fac-
tual circumstances. See Belton, supra, at 458-460; Robbins 
v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 430 (1981) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 213-214 (1979); 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 235 (1973). The 
ad hoc approach not only makes it difficult for the policeman 
to discern the scope of his authority, Belton, supra, at 460; it 
also creates a danger that constitutional rights will be arbi-
trarily and inequitably enforced. Cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415 
u. s. 566, 572-573 (1974). 
III 
In any event, while the factors that petitioner Oliver and 
respondent Thornton urge the courts to consider are relevant 
to Fourth Amendment analysis in some contexts, we do not 
agree that these factors can be decisive on the question 
whether the search of an open field is reasonable. Initially, 
we reject the suggestion that steps taken to protect privacy 
establish that expectations of privacy in an open field are le-
gitimate. It is true, of course, that petitioner Oliver and re-
spondent Thornton, in order to conceal their criminal activi-
ties, planted the marijuana upon secluded land and erected 
fences and no trespassing signs around the property. And it 
may be that because of such precautions, few members of the 
public stumbled upon the marijuana crops seized by the po-
lice. Neither of these suppositions demonstrates, however, 
that the expectation of privacy was legitimate in the sense re-
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quired by the Fourth Amendment. The test of legitimacy is 
not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly "pri-
vate" activityY Rather, the correct inquiry is whether a 
warrantless search infringes upon the societal values pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. As we have explained, 
we find no basis for concluding that a police inspection of open 
fields accomplishes such an infringement. 
Nor is search of a field "unreasonable" in the constitutional 
sense because that search is a trespass at common law. The 
existence of a property right is but one element in determin-
ing whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. "'[T]he 
premise that property interests control the right of the Gov-
ernment to search and seize has been discredited."' Katz, 
389 U. S., at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 
304 (1967)). "[E]ven a property interest in premises may 
not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy with respect to particular items located on the premises 
or activity conducted thereon." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U. S., at 144 n. 12. 
The common law may guide consideration of the reason-
ableness of a search by defining areas whose invasion by oth-
ers is wrongful. I d., at 153 (POWELL, J., concurring). 12 The 
law of trespass, however, forbids intrusions upon land that 
the Fourth Amendment would not proscribe. For trespass 
law extends to instances where the exercise of the right to 
exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest. 13 It is par-
11 Certainly the Framers did not intend that the Fourth Amendment 
should shelter criminal activity wherever persons with criminal intent 
choose to erect barriers and post no trespassing signs. 
12 As noted above, the common law conception of the "curtilage" has 
served this function. 
13 The common law of trespass furthers a range of interests that have 
nothing to do with privacy, such as the owner's interest in defeating claims 
of prescription by asserting his own title. See, e. g., 0. W. Holmes, The 
Common Law 98-100, 244-246 (1881). Criminal laws against trespass are 
prophylactic: they protect against intruders who poach, steal crops or van-
dalize property. The primary function of fences and no trespassing signs 
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ticularly implausible to insist that any trespass upon an open 
field is an unreasonable search when the reasonableness of 
aerial surveillance, which acc'omplishes as great an intrusion 
upon a landowner's privacy, is conceded. See note 9, supra. 
Thus, in the case of open fields, the general rights of property 
protected by the common law of trespass yield to society's in-
terest in effective law enforcement. 
IV 
The disposition of the two cases before us follows readily 
from basic principles. Oliver v. United States is affirmed; 
Maine v. Thornton is reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
traditionally has been to permit application of the state laws of criminal 
trespass, not to assert some general expectation of privacy. See, e. g., 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, §402.1.C (1983) (trespass to enter a place 
"which is posted . . . in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention 
of intruders or which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed 
to exclude intruders"); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 511.070 (1975) (trespass to enter 
"upon premises as to which notice against trespass is given by fencing or 
other enclosure"). 
Modern commentators have rationalized the broad common law protec-
tions by noting that anyone who wishes to use the property is free to bar-
gain for the right to do so with the property owner. R. Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Law 10-13, 21 (1973). From this perspective, any use of prop-
erty is presumptively unjustified if that use is unlicensed by the owner. 
This economic rationale of the common law of trespass confirms that the 
common law will confer protections from intrusion far broader than those 
required by Fourth Amendment interests. 
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The "open fields" doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in 
Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924), permits police 
officers to enter and search a field without a warrant. We 
granted certiorari in these cases to clarify confusion that has 
arisen as to the continued vitality of the doctrine. 
I 
No. 82-15. Acting on reports that marijuana was being 
raised on the farm of petitioner Oliver, two narcotics agents 
of the Kentucky State Police went to the farm to investi-
gate. 1 Arriving at the farm, they drove past petitioner's 
house to a locked gate with a "No Trespassing" sign. A foot-
path led around one side of the gate. The agents walked 
' It is conceded that the police did not have a warrant authorizing the 
search, that there was no probable cause for the search and that no excep-
tion to the warrant requirement is applicable. 
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around the gate and along the road for several hundred 
yards, passing a barn and a parked camper. At that point, 
someone standing in front of the camper shouted, "No hunt-
ing is allowed, come back here." The officers shouted back 
that they were Kentucky State Police officers, but found no 
one when they returned to the camper. The officers re-
sumed their investigation of the farm and found a field of 
marijuana over a mile from petitioner's home. 
Petitioner was arrested and indicted for "manufactur[ing]" 
a "controlled substance." 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). After a 
pretrial hearing, the District Court suppressed evidence of 
the discovery of the marijuana fields. Applying Katz v. 
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967), the court found that 
petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the fields would 
remain private because petitioner "had done all that could be 
expected of him to assert his privacy in the area of farm that 
was searched." He had posted no trespassing signs at regu-
lar intervals and had locked the gate at the entrance to the 
center of the farm. Pet. App., at 2~24. Further, the court 
noted that the fields themselves are highly secluded: they are 
bounded on all sides by woods, fences and embankments and 
cannot be seen from any point of public access. The court 
concluded that this was not an "open" field that invited casual 
intrusion. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed the district court. 686 F. 2d 356 (1982). 2 The 
court concluded that Katz, upon which the District Court re-
lied, had not impaired the vitality of the open fields doctrine 
of Hester. Rather, the open fields doctrine was entirely 
compatible with Katz's emphasis on privacy. The court rea-
soned that the "human relations that create the need for pri-
vacy do not ordinarily take place" in open fields, and that the 
property owner's common law right to exclude trespassers is 
insufficiently linked to privacy to warrant the Fourth 
2 A panel of the Sixth Circuit had affirmed the suppression order. 657 F. 
2d 85 (1981). 
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Amendment's protection. Id., at 360.3 We granted certio-
rari. - U. S. - (1983). 
No. 82-1273. After receiving an anonymous tip that mari-
juana was being grown in the woods behind respondent 
Thornton's residence, two police officers entered the woods 
by a path between this residence and a neighboring house. 
They followed a footpath through the woods until they 
reached two marijuana patches fenced with chicken wire. 
Later, the officers determined that the patches were on the 
property of respondent, obtained a warrant to search the 
property and seized the marijuana. On the basis of this evi-
dence, respondent was arrested and indicted. 
The trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress 
the fruits of the second search. The warrant for this search 
was premised on information that the police had obtained 
during their previous warrantless search, that the court 
found to be unreasonable. 4 "No Trespassing" signs and the 
secluded location of the marijuana patches evinced a reason-
able expectation of privacy. Therefore, the court held, the 
"open fields" doctrine did not apply. 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 453 A. 2d 
489 (1982). It agreed with the trial court that the correct 
question was whether the search "is a violation of privacy on 
which the individual justifiably relied," id., at 493, and that 
the search violated respondent's privacy. The court also 
agreed that the "open fields" doctrine did not justify the 
search. That doctrine applies, according to the court, only 
3 The four dissenting judges contended that the open fields doctrine did 
not apply where, as in this case, "reasonable efforts have been made to ex-
clude the public." 686 F. 2d, at 372. To that extent, the dissent consid-
ered that Katz v. United States, supra, implicitly had overruled previous 
holdings of this Court. The dissent then concluded that petitioner had es-
tablished a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the Katz standard. 
Judge Lively also wrote separately to argue that the open fields doctrine 
applied only to lands that could be viewed by the public. 
'The court also discredited other information, supplied by a confidential 
informant, upon which the police had based their warrant application. 
82-15 & 82-1273-0PINION 
4 OLIVER v. UNITED STATES 
when officers are lawfully present on property and observe 
"open and patent" activity. ld., at 495. In this case, the 
officers had trespassed upon defendant's property, and the 
respondent had made every effort to conceal his activity. 
We granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1983). 5 
II 
The rule announced in Hester v. United States was founded 
upon the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment. That 
Amendment indicates with some precision the places and 
things encompassed by its protections. As Justice Holmes 
explained for the Court in his characteristically laconic style: 
"[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment 
to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is 
not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the 
latter and the house is as old as the common law." Hester v. 
United States, 265 U. S., at 59. 6 
6 Respondent contends that the decision below rests upon adequate and 
independent state law grounds. We do not read that decision, however, 
as excluding the evidence because the search violated the state constitu-
tion. The Maine Supreme Court referred only to the Fourth Amendment 
of the federal Constitution and purported to apply the Katz test; the prior 
state cases that the court cited also construed the federal Constitution. In 
any case, the Maine Supreme Court did not articulate an independent state 
ground with the clarity required by Michigan v. Long, -- U. S. --
(1983). 
Contrary to respondent's assertion, we do not review here the state 
courts' finding as a matter of "fact" that the area searched was not an "open 
field." Rather, the question before us is the appropriate legal standard for 
determining whether search of that area without a warrant was lawful 
under the federal Constitution. 
The conflict between the two cases that we review here is illustrative of 
the confusion the "open fields" doctrine has generated among the state and 
federal courts. Compare, e. g., State v. Byers, 359 So. 2d 84 (La. 1978) 
(refusing to apply open fields doctrine); State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093 
(Fla. 1981) (same), with United States v. Lace, 669 F. 2d 46, 50-51 (CA2 
1982); United States v. Freie, 545 F. 2d 1217 (CA9 1976); United States v. 
Brown, 473 F. 2d 952, 954 (CA5 1973); Atwell v. United States, 414 F. 2d 
136, 138 (CA5 1969). 
l "The dissent offers no basis for its suggestion that Hester rests upon some narrow, unarticulated principle rather than upon the reasoning enun-
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Nor are the open fields "effects" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. In this respect, it is suggestive that 
James Madison's proposed draft of what became the Fourth 
Amendment preserves "[t]he rights of the people to be se-
cured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their 
other property, from all unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. . . . " See N. Lasson, The History and Development 
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
100, n. 77 (1937). Although Congress' revisions of Madison's 
proposal broadened the scope of the Amendment in some re-
spects, id., at 100-103, the term "effects" is less inclusive 
than "property" and cannot be said to encompass open 
fields. 7 We conclude, as did the Court in deciding Hester v. 
United States, that the government's intrusion upon the open 
fields is not one of those "unreasonable searches" proscribed 
by the text of the Fourth Amendment. 
III 
This interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's language is 
consistent with the understanding of the right to privacy ex-
I ciated by the Court's opinion in that case. Nor have subsequent cases dis-credited Hester's reasoning. This Court frequently has relied on the ex-
plicit language of the Fourth Amendment as delineating the scope of its 
affirmative protections. See, e. g., Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 
426 (1981) (opinion of Stewart, J.); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 
58~90; Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 17~180 (1969). As 
these cases, decided after Katz, indicate, Katz's "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" standard did not sever Fourth Amendment doctrine from the 
Amendment's language. Katz itself construed the Amendment's protec-
tion of the person against unreasonable searches to encompass electronic 
eavesdropping of telephone conversations sought to be kept private; and 
Katz's fundamental recognition that "the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures," 
see 389 U. S., at 353, is faithful to the Amendment's language. As Katz 
demonstrates, the Court fairly may respect the constraints of the Constitu-
tion's language without wedding itself to a unreasoning literalism. In con-
trast, the dissent's approach would ignor the language of the Constitution 
itself as well as overturn this Court's governing precedent. 
7 The Framers would have understood the term "effects" to be limited 
to personal, rather than real, property. See generally, Doe v. Dring, 2M. 
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pressed in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Since 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), the touchstone of 
Amendment analysis has been the question whether a person 
has a "constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of 
privacy." 389 U. S., at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). The 
Amendment does not protect the merely subjective expecta-
tion of privacy, but only "those expectations that society is 
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Id., at 361. See 
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740-741 (1979). 
A 
No single factor determines whether an individual legiti-
mately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place 
should be free of government intrusion not authorized by 
warrant. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 152-153 
(1978) (POWELL, J., concurring). In assessing the degree to 
which a search infringes upon individual privacy, the Court 
has given weight to such factors as the intention of the Fram-
ers of the Fourth Amendment, e. g. United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1977), the uses to which the individual 
has put a location, e. g., Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 
257, 265 (1960), and our societal understanding that certain 
areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from govern-
ment invasion, e. g., Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 
(1980). These factors are equally relevant to determining 
whether the government's intrusion upon open fields without 
a warrant or probable cause violates reasonable expectations 
of privacy and is therefore a search proscribed by the 
Amendment. 
In this light, the rule of Hester v. United States, supra, 
that we reaffirm today, may be understood as providing that 
an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activi-
ties conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area imme-
& S. 448, 454 (1814) (discussing prior cases); 2 Blackstone, Commentar-
ies 16, 384-385. 
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diately surrounding the home. See also Air Pollution Vari-
ance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861, 865 (1974). 
This rule is true to the conception of the right to privacy em-
bodied in the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment reflects 
the recognition of the Founders that certain enclaves should 
be free from arbitrary government interference. For exam-
ple, the Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment 
has stressed "the overriding respect for the sanctity of the 
home that has been embedded in our traditions since the ori-
gins of the Republic." Payton v. New York, supra, at 601. 8 
See also Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 
(1961); United States v. United States District Court, 407 
u. s. 293, 313 (1972). 
In contrast, open fields do not provide the setting for those 
intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter 
from government interference or surveillance. There is no 
societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, 
such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields. 
Moreover, as a practical matter these lands usually are acces-
sible to the public and the police in ways that a home, an of-
fice or commercial structure would not be. It is not gener-
ally true that fences or no trespassing signs effectively bar 
the public from viewing open fields in rural areas. And both 
petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton concede that the 
public and police lawfully may survey lands from the air. 9 
8 The Fourth Amendment's protection of offices and commercial build-
ings, in which there may be legitimate expectations of privacy, is also 
based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the 
Amendment. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 311 (1978); 
G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 355 (1977) 
9 Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15, 58. See, e. g., United States v. Allen, 675 F. 
2d 1373, 1380-1381 (CA9 1980); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 
1078, 1081 (WD Mich. 1980). In practical terms, petitioner Oliver's and 
respondent Thornton's analysis merely would require law enforcement offi-
cers, in most situations, to use aerial surveillance to gather the information 
necessary to obtain a warrant or to justify warrantless entry onto the prop-
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For these reasons, the asserted expectation of privacy in 
open fields is not an expectation that "society recognizes as 
reasonable." 10 
The historical underpinnings of the "open fields" doctrine 
also demonstrate that the doctrine is consistent with respect 
for "reasonable expectations of privacy." As Justice 
Holmes, writing for the Court, observed in Hester, 265 
U. S., at 57, the common law distinguished "open fields" 
from the "curtilage," the land immediately surrounding and 
associated with the home. See 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 
*225. The distinction implies that only the curtilage, not the 
neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth Amendment 
protections that attach to the home. At common law, the 
curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity 
associated with the "sanctity of a man's home and the priva-
cies of life," Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), 
J I 
and therefore has been considered part of home itself for 
Fourth Amendment purposes. Thus, courts have extended 
Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage; and they 
have defined the curtilage, as did the common law, by refer-
erty. It is not easy to see how such a requirement would advance legiti-
mate privacy interests. 
10 The dissent conceives of open fields as bustling with private activity as 
diverse as lovers' trysts and worship services. Post, at 8-9. But in most 
instances police will disturb no one when they enter upon open fields. 
These fields, by their very character as open and unoccupied, are unlikely 
to provide the setting for activities whose privacy is sought to be protected 
by the Fourth Amendment. One need think only of the vast expanse of 
some western ranches or of the undeveloped woods of the Northwest to see 
the unreality of the dissent's conception. Further, the Fourth Amend-
ment provides ample protection to activities in the open fields that might 
implicate an individual's privacy. An individual who enters a place defined 
to be "public" for Fourth Amendment analysis does not lose all claims to 
privacy or personal security. Cf. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 
76&-767 (1979) (BURGER, C. J., concurring). For example, the Fourth 
Amendment's protections against unreasonable arrest or unreasonable sei-
zure of effects upon the person remain fully applicable. See, e. g., United 
States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976). 
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ence to the factors that determine whether an individual rea-
sonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the 
home will remain private. See, e. g., United States v. van 
Dyke, 643 F. 2d 992, 993-994 (CA4 1981); United States v. 
Williams, 581 F. 2d 451, 453 (CA5 1978); Care v. United 
States, 231 F. 2d 22, 25 (CAlO), cert. denied, 351 U. S. 932 
(1956). Conversely, the common law implies, as we reaffirm 
today, that no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to 
open fields. 11 
We conclude, from the text of the Fourth Amendment and 
from the historical and contemporary understanding of its 
purposes, that an individual has no legitimate expectation 
that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion 
by government officers. 
B 
Petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton contend, to the 
contrary, that the circumstances of a search sometimes may 
indicate that reasonable expectations of privacy were vio-
lated; and that courts therefore should analyze these circum-
stances on a case-by-case basis. The language of the Fourth 
Amendment itself answers their contention. 
Nor would a case-by-case approach provide a workable ac-
commodation between the needs of law enforcement and the 
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Under this 
approach, police officers would have to guess before every 
11 Neither petitioner Oliver nor respondent Thornton has contended that 
the property searched was within the curtilage. Nor is it necessary in this 
case to consider the scope of the curtilage exception to the open fields doc-
trine or the degree of Fourth Amendment protection afforded the curti-
lage, as opposed to the home itself. It is clear, however, that the term 
"open fields" may include any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of 
the curtilage. An open field need be neither "open" nor a "field" as those 
terms are used in common speech. For example, contrary to respondent 
Thornton's suggestion, Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-22, a thickly wooded area none-
theless may be an open field as that term is used in construing the Fourth 
Amendment. See, e. g., United States v. Pruitt, 464 F . 2d 494 (CA9 
1972); Bedell v. State, 257 Ark. 895, 521 S. W. 2d 200 (1975). 
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search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently 
high, posted a sufficient number of warning signs, or located 
contraband in an area sufficiently secluded to establish a 
right of privacy. The lawfulness of a search would turn on 
"[a] highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of 
ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nu-
ances and hairline distinctions .... " New York v. Belton, 
453 U. S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting LaFave, "Case-By-Case 
Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robin-
son Dilemma, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 127, 142). This Court repeat-
edly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, po-
lice and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of 
Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in differing fac-
tual circumstances. See Belton, supra, at 458-460; Robbins 
v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 430 (1981) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 213-214 (1979); 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 235 (1973). The 
ad hoc approach not only makes it difficult for the policeman 
to discern the scope of his authority, Belton, supra, at 460; it 
also creates a danger that constitutional rights will be arbi-
trarily and inequitably enforced. Cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415 
u. s. 566, 572-573 (1974). 12 
IV 
In any event, while the factors that petitioner Oliver and 
respondent Thornton urge the courts to consider may be rele-
12 The clarity of the open fields doctrine that we reaffirm today is not 
sacrificed, as the dissent suggests, by our recognition that the curtilage re-
mains within the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Most of the 
many millions of acres that are "open fields" are not close to any structure 
and so not arguably within the curtilage. And, for most homes, the 
boundaries of the curtilage will be clearly marked; and the conception de-
fining the curtilage-as the area around the home to which the activity of 
home life extends-is a familiar one easily understood from our daily ex-
perience. The occasional difficulties that courts might have in applying 
this, like other, legal concepts, do not argue for the unprecedented expan-
sion of the Fourth Amendment advocated by the dissent. 
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vant to Fourth Amendment analysis in some contexts, these 
factors cannot be decisive on the question whether the search 
of an open field is subject to the Amendment. Initially, we 
reject the suggestion that steps taken to protect privacy es-
tablish that expectations of privacy in an open field are legiti-
mate.. It is true, of course, that petitioner Oliver and re-
spondent Thornton, in order to conceal their criminal 
activities, planted the marijuana upon secluded land and 
erected fences and no trespassing signs around the property. 
And it may be that because of such precautions, few mem-
bers of the public stumbled upon the marijuana crops seized 
by the police. Neither of these suppositions demonstrates, 
however, that the expectation of privacy was legitimate in 
the sense required by the Fourth Amendment. The test of 
legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal 
assertedly "private" activity. 13 Rather, the correct inquiry 
is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the per-
sonal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment. As we have explained, we find no basis for concluding 
that a police inspection of open fields accomplishes such an 
infringement. 
Nor is the government's intrusion upon an open field a 
"search" in the constitutional sense because that intrusion is 
a trespass at common law. The existence of a property right 
is but one element in determining whether expectations of 
privacy are legitimate. "'[T]he premise that property inter-
ests control the right of the Government to search and seize 
has been discredited."' Katz, 389 U. S., at 353 (quoting 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 304 (1967)). "[E]ven a 
property interest in premises may not be sufficient to estab-
lish a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to par-
ticular items located on the premises or activity conducted 
thereon." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S., at 144 n. 12. 
13 Certainly the Framers did not intend that the Fourth Amendment 
should shelter criminal activity wherever persons with criminal intent 
choose to erect barriers and post no trespassing signs. 
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The common law may guide consideration of what areas 
are protected by the Fourth Amendment search by defining 
areas whose invasion by others is wrongful. I d., at 153 
(POWELL, J., concurring). 14 The law of trespass, however, 
forbids intrusions upon land that the Fourth Amendment 
would not proscribe. For trespass law extends to instances 
where the exercise of the right to exclude vindicates no legiti-
mate privacy interest. 15 Thus, in the case of open fields, the 
general rights of property protected by the common law of 
trespass have little or no relevance to the applicability of the 
Fourth Amendment. v 
We conclude that the open fields doctrine, as enunciated in 
Hester, is consistent with the plain language of the Fourth 
Amendment and its historical purposes. Moreover, Justice 
Holmes' interpretation of the Amendment in Hester accords 
with the "reasonable expectation of privacy" analysis devel-
oped in subsequent decisions of this Court. We therefore af-
firm Oliver v. United States; Maine v. Thornton is reversed 
14 As noted above, the common law conception of the "curtilage" has 
served this function. 
15 The law of trespass recognizes the interest in possession and control of 
one's property and for that reason permits exclusion of unwanted intrud-
ers. But it does not follow that the right to exclude conferred by trespass 
law embodies a privacy interest also protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
To the contrary, the common law of trespass furthers a range of interests 
that have nothing to do with privacy and that would not be served by ap-
plying the strictures of trespass law to public officers. Criminal laws 
against trespass are prophylactic: they protect against intruders who 
poach, steal livestock and crops or vandalize property. And the civil ac-
tion of trespass serves the important function of authorizing an owner to 
defeat claims of prescription by asserting his own title. See, e. g., O.W. 
Holmes, The Common Law, at 98-100, 244-246. In any event, unlicensed 
use of property by others is presumptively unjustified, as anyone who 
wishes to use the property is free to bargain for the right to do so with the 
property owner, cf. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, at pp. 10-13, 21 
(1973). For these reasons, the law of trespass confers protections from 
intrusion by others far broader than those required by Fourth Amendment 
interests. 
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and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
